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ABSTRACT 
 
I define and defend a non-democratic authority with the power to annul the decisions of 
democratic branches of government when such decisions infringe upon citizens’ basic 
rights and liberties. I refer to this non-democratic authority as Liberal Aristocracy. The 
argument for Liberal Aristocracy has two parts: the first part demonstrates that Liberal 
Aristocracy will arrive at decisions that further the moral end of sustaining citizens’ 
rights; the second part holds that Liberal Aristocracy is a moral means to this end. 
 First, I discuss two existing arguments for non-democratic authorities – Platonic 
Aristocracy and Constitutional Court Judges. I claim that Plato’s argument is 
unsuccessful because it relies on controversial metaethical premises that are unlikely to 
provide a basis for rights. Liberal justifications of the power of Constitutional Courts are 
argued to be incomplete because they do not designate an authority that is qualified to 
decide when citizens’ rights are infringed by democratic branches of government. Nor do 
they show that such an authority is in fact required if citizens’ rights are to be protected. 
In order to supplement the liberal argument for the power of Constitutional Courts I 
develop an account of Liberal Aristocracy, which rests on the idea that Constitutional 
Court Judges should possess moral expertise. I claim that (i) moral expertise qualifies 
Judges to decide when citizens’ rights are violated by democratic decisions. Furthermore, 
I argue that (ii) decisions taken democratically will sometimes encroach on citizens’ 
rights. Claims (i) and (ii) are shown to justify the non-democratic authority of Liberal 
Aristocracy.  
 The second part of the argument for Liberal Aristocracy examines arguments to 
the effect that only democratic procedures can be morally legitimate, even if other 
decision procedures arrive at outcomes that provide greater support for citizens’ rights. 
Three claims are offered in support of this idea. First, democracy is claimed to be 
necessary to support deliberation. Second, democracy is seen as the only procedure that 
can uphold the value of autonomy by securing citizens’ consent. Third, it is argued that 
non-democratic procedures will not recognise the equal status of citizens. I hold that 
these three claims are false and that Liberal Aristocratic procedures can be morally 
legitimate. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Context 
“Constitutional democracy” is believed by some to be a tautology; by others it is seen 
as an oxymoron [Bellamy & Castiglione, 595]. It is taken to be a tautology because 
democracy must be a rule-governed procedure, and Constitutions can be seen as 
“codifying the rules of the democratic game, indicating who can vote, how [,]when 
and why” [ibid.]. That is, Constitutions express rights, including those that are 
necessary for the democratic process. 
 On the other hand constitutional democracy can be seen as an oxymoron 
because Constitutional law is usually placed beyond the reach of majoritarian 
decision-making. Citizens are bound by laws that they did not directly choose, and 
with which the majority may disagree. The death penalty, and the recent decision to 
permit homosexual marriage are, I believe, examples in which the will of the majority 
is thwarted. Instead, decisions regarding the Constitution, such as these, are to a great 
extent placed in the hands of a minority of Judges. If democracy is taken to mean that 
people should rule then why should the people or their elected representatives not be 
free to change the rules as they see fit? Why should a minority be given greater power 
over the core laws of a society? This dissertation provides an answer as to why 
democracy should be thus constrained, and shows how Constitutional Courts Judges’ 
authority to place limitations on democracy could be justified. 
 
1. Rights & Democracy 
Democratic procedures1 are usually thought to be justifiable on the basis of liberal 
values such as equality and autonomy. These values are also thought to justify the 
existence of individual rights [Hyland, 152], which place limits on the harms and 
losses that any individual can reasonably be expected to endure [Waldron, 400]. 
                                                          
1 In this dissertation I define democracy in a minimal way as entailing egalitarian procedures, involving 
political equality in all the moments of decision-making. All sane adults have an equal say in 
collectively binding decisions, or in the election of representatives who will take collectively binding 
decisions [Hyland, Ch.3]. 
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Theorists such as Locke and Rawls have claimed that there are some basic rights and 
liberties that should “no longer be the subject for political decision by majority or 
other plurality voting” [Rawls (1993), 151]. For instance, the right to life and bodily 
integrity, and the right to freedom of expression and of religion ought to be inviolable 
either by individual citizens or by government. Other theorists, such as Dahl, suggest 
that it is “highly reasonable to argue that no interests should be inviolable beyond 
th[o]se integral and essential to the democratic process” [Dahl, 182]. That is, the only 
rights that should be beyond the reach of government are those required for the proper 
operation of democracy. 
 Although these accounts differ substantially they share the same structure. 
They hold both that collectively binding decisions ought to be taken democratically, 
and that some rights – whether they are rights of democratic participation, property 
rights, or rights to free expression – ought to be inviolable even by democratically 
taken decisions. 
These two related claims – that liberalism entails democracy and that 
liberalism entails rights – are the foundation of liberal democracy, or the liberal 
democratic synthesis [Hyland, 148]. There is, however an apparent inconsistency in 
this synthesis that Hyland demonstrates with the following illustration. 
Imagine a political theorist who has just formulated some such theory of 
rights… and has gone on to specify a set of constitutional provisions grounded 
in the theory. Leaving her or his study he or she descends into the world of 
real-life politics in an actual community. Though delighted to find that the 
procedures of rule perfectly conform with democratic principles, our political 
theorist is horrified to discover that the scope of power actually claimed by the 
democratic process pays scant respect to the theorist’s liberal principles. What 
response can the theorist make? He or she could of course, express 
disapproval, proclaim the illegitimacy of even democratic government in the 
areas prescribed by the theory of natural rights, publicly proclaim the 
constitutional limitations that would respect the schedule of natural rights. But 
how would our theorist envisage such constitutional limitations being 
implemented, ratified, interpreted and enforced? By what agency? [ibid., 153]. 
 
The question that is raised by this example is how restrictions on the scope of 
democratic decision-making should be specified. If it is discovered that democratic 
decision making has exceeded its legitimate scope and encroached upon citizens’ 
rights, what agency or procedure should implement the proposed rights-based 
restrictions on democratic decisions? 
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 There are two potential answers to this question. First, an agency subordinate 
to the democratic process could take decisions about the legitimate scope of 
democratic decisions. That is, decisions as to what rights citizens should be accorded 
should be taken democratically. So, for instance, questions regarding the proper scope 
of democratic decisions could be decided by referenda, or by democratically elected 
representatives. In this case, however, it is possible that the individual rights in the 
private sphere could be violated by majorities, thus sacrificing liberal aspects of the 
liberal democratic synthesis. Democracy could even undermine itself by voting to 
exclude certain groups from the franchise. 
 The second solution is to empower an external authority independent of 
democratic decision-making (such as a Constitutional Court) to regulate the scope of 
democratic decisions, and prevent citizens’ rights from being undermined. In this case 
the democratic aspect of the liberal democratic synthesis is diluted, since citizens do 
not participate in the making of all collectively binding decisions. 
 Thus there is a potential conflict between liberal rights and the democratic 
right to participate in making all collectively binding decisions. This is the 
inconsistency of the liberal democratic synthesis. Should we favour the first solution, 
and thus run the risk of sacrificing individual rights, or should the second solution be 
preferred, to the detriment of democracy? I will argue against the idea that democratic 
procedures should be used to decide questions regarding rights and propose a version 
of the second solution. That is, I will specify an authority external to the democratic 
process that ought to decide questions concerning the basic rights and liberties of 
citizens. Such decisions ought not to be taken democratically if there is an appropriate 
external authority. 
As will now be shown this claim will involve (i) holding that democracy is 
unlikely to reach decisions regarding rights that are as acceptable as those that would 
be reached by a particular alternative authority, and (ii) undermining the idea that 
democracy is the only moral means of taking collectively binding decisions. 
 
1.2. Outline of the Arguments 
The claim that decisions regarding the proper scope of democratic decisions ought to 
be taken democratically will be referred to as the Moral Superiority of Democratic 
Procedures thesis (MSDP). Two central claims are offered in support of MSDP.  
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 First, it is claimed that democratic decision procedures are as likely as any 
external authority to reach the correct decisions about the proper scope of democratic 
decision-making. That is, democratic procedures are likely to achieve substantive 
outcomes that uphold citizens’ rights. Democratic decision-making is capable of 
being self-restricting and achieves the moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights. Thus 
there is no need for an external authority: democratic procedures are just as 
compatible with sustaining rights as other procedures. If so the above inconsistency in 
the liberal democratic synthesis disappears since liberal rights need not be 
undermined by democracy. That is, if democratic procedures will reach the correct 
decisions about rights, then the liberal democratic synthesis remains intact because the 
democratic element and the liberal rights element are consistent with one another. 
Thus, to argue that an authority external to democratic procedures should make 
decisions concerning rights, it must be shown that such an authority is more likely to 
arrive at the correct decisions concerning such rights. 
 In order to make this claim it is clearly necessary to specify what such an 
authority would be. To this end, I examine Plato’s arguments for decision-making by 
Philosopher rulers, which I refer to as Platonic Aristocracy. I argue that Platonic 
Aristocracy is unsuited to the task of providing rights-based restrictions on democratic 
decisions because it relies on controversial metaethical premises. Further, I claim that, 
given Plato’s antipathy towards democracy and the liberal basis of rights, it is 
extremely unlikely that Platonic Aristocracy would be a satisfactory candidate for 
making decisions concerning liberal rights. However, from Plato’s account I glean 
important structural requirements that must be fulfilled if a non-democratic agency is 
to be justified. These are applied my discussion of the liberal justifications for the 
authority of Constitutional Court Judges. 
 Constitutional Court Judges are an alternative and more generally accepted 
authority on decisions regarding citizens’ rights. They are empowered to make 
judgments that regulate the decisions of democratically elected governments –
judgements which might undermine the wishes of the majority. I discuss existing 
justifications for the Constitutional Court’s power to review and overrule decisions of 
democratic branches, and argue that the structural requirements gleaned from Plato’s 
account are not fulfilled. This is because it is unclear that Judges are more qualified 
than democratic branches of government to make decisions that uphold citizens’ 
rights. Liberal justifications of Judicial review are thus flawed because there is 
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insufficient reason to think that Judges’ decisions will be superior to those that would 
be reached democratically. The idea that Judges will uphold the moral end of 
sustaining citizens’ rights lacks adequate justification. This means that proponents of 
MSDP can claim that Constitutional Court Judges’ power to constrain democratic 
decision-making arbitrarily undermines democratic sovereignty. How, then, can 
Judges’ role in determining the limits of democracy be justified? 
 In order to answer this question I introduce and develop an account of Liberal 
Aristocracy, which rests on an conception of Constitutional Court Judges as requiring 
moral expertise. I argue that moral experts will arrive at decisions regarding rights 
that are likely to be more justified than those that would be arrived at democratically. 
If Constitutional Court Judges possess moral expertise their role is thus justified 
because they prevent substantive moral losses that would accrue if democracy was 
given free rein in matters concerning rights. That is, they support the moral end of 
preventing encroachment on citizens’ rights. 
 
The second and strongest claim offered in support of the idea that decisions about 
rights ought to be taken democratically is that the delimitation of the scope of 
democratic decisions can only be morally legitimate if it is done democratically. 
These proceduralist accounts hold that democracy is the only moral means of taking 
collectively binding decisions. As mentioned above, such claims are usually made on 
the basis of liberal values. Thus external restrictions on the scope of democratic 
decision-making are seen to be inconsistent with liberal values. In order to argue 
against MSDP it must therefore be shown that a non-democratic procedure could be a 
moral means of taking collectively binding decisions. 
 In responding to this claim I argue that Liberal Aristocratic procedures could 
indeed take collectively binding decisions without contravening moral values such as 
autonomy. That is, I will argue that traditional liberal arguments for democratic 
procedures do not justify democracy to any greater extent than they do Liberal 
Aristocracy. Liberal Aristocracy is a moral means of constraining democracy in 
matters concerning rights. 
 
Thus both claims are refuted: democracy is neither as likely to achieve the moral end 
of upholding rights as Liberal Aristocracy, nor is it the only moral means of taking 
collectively binding decisions about rights. Since this is the case MSDP is shown to 
 5
be false. Liberal Aristocratic – not democratic – procedures ought to be used to 
regulate the scope of democratic decisions. Thus, provided they have moral expertise, 
the role of Constitutional Court Judges is justified because, in constraining 
democracy, they uphold citizens’ rights without undermining the values that are the 
basis of such rights. 
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CHAPTER 2: MORAL ENDS 
 
In this chapter, I develop and defend an account of an extra-democratic authority that 
will have the power to annul democratic laws when they conflict with the reasonable 
provisions of the Constitution. To this end I discuss Plato’s argument that society 
ought to be governed not democratically, but rather by Philosopher rulers (§2.1). 
From this argument I ascertain basic structural considerations that must be taken into 
account when justifying an external authority. I apply these considerations to liberal 
attempts to justify the extra-democratic authority of Constitutional Court Judges and 
claim that such justifications are lacking, since they fail to show that Judges are more 
qualified than democratic majorities to make decisions regarding rights (§2.2). This 
finding is significant because without further argument proponents of MSDP could  
claim that democratic decisions are arbitrarily restricted by an insufficiently qualified 
minority of Judges. Democratic sovereignty might be unjustifiably undermined. 
 In order to show that this need not be the case I develop an account of Liberal 
Aristocracy (§2.3), which rests on a conception of Constitutional Court Judges as 
moral experts. I argue that moral expertise qualifies Judges to make decisions 
regarding citizens’ rights. However, this alone is insufficient to justify their power to 
constrain the decisions of democratic branches of government. It must also be shown 
that democratic procedures are more likely than Judges to reach incorrect decisions 
with respect to the moral end of protecting citizens’ rights, otherwise Judges’ 
qualifications are redundant. I argue that democratic procedures are indeed likely to 
reach decisions that are less justifiable than the decisions of Judges with moral 
expertise (§2.4). This shown, the power of Constitutional Court Judges to revoke the 
decisions of democratic branches is justified because, provided they are moral 
experts, Judges’ decisions will further the moral end of protecting citizens’ rights to a 
greater extent than democratically taken decisions. 
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2.1. Platonic Aristocracy 
In this section I discuss Plato’s contention that society should be governed by 
Philosopher rulers. My purposes here are twofold. First, I argue that Platonic 
Aristocracy is unsuited to the task of taking decisions regarding citizens’ rights.  This 
is because it relies on controversial metaethical premises that must be abandoned if 
the claims of moral relativists and moral sceptics are taken into account. Further, 
Plato’s rejection of democracy and liberal values make Platonic Aristocracy an 
unsuitable candidate for decisions concerning liberal rights and the proper scope of 
democracy. The second and central aim of this section is to arrive at structural 
considerations that must be taken into account in justifying extra-democratic 
authorities. 
 
1. Ruling & Knowledge of Forms 
Plato argued that there are objective metaphysical Forms, such as the Form of Justice 
and the Form of the Good, that exist independently of human thought, and which can 
only be discovered through Reason. Specifically, such Forms can only be known by 
the just man – the Philosopher whose soul is ruled by Reason [Plato, 441e; 507b]. It is 
only in the full apprehension of these Forms that knowledge is possible. Those who 
recognise only particular manifestations of these Forms have only opinion and not 
knowledge. So for instance if I recognise that a painting is beautiful, I do not 
necessarily have knowledge of what Beauty ‘really is’, merely opinion about what is 
beautiful [ibid., 474c-480]. Knowledge is stable and unshifting, whereas opinion is 
subject to whim and passing fancy. 
 Since only ideal Philosophers can attain knowledge of Forms, only they can 
know how society ought to be in order to be in accordance with Justice and the Good 
[ibid., 428d]. Thus in order for a society to be truly just it must be ruled by 
Philosopher kings or queens who will shape it according to the Form of Justice. A 
democratic society is thus flawed because, by allowing everyone an equal say in 
government, it treats all opinions as equal, whereas in fact the opinions of 
Philosophers are superior since they constitute Knowledge. Plato’s claim is thus that 
society should not be ruled democratically by the demos, but rather aristocratically by 
a minority of Philosophers. 
 Plato uses several metaphors to indicate his antipathy towards democracy and 
his belief in the superiority of aristocracy. In one such metaphor, the polis is likened 
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to a ship. The captain of the ship is an expert navigator, whereas the other crew 
members have no knowledge of navigation. 
They have no idea that the true navigator must study the seasons of the year, 
the sky, the stars the winds… and they think it’s quite impossible to acquire 
the professional skill needed for such control… and that there’s no such thing 
as the art of navigation. [ibid., 488d]. 
 
As such when they take control of the ship they turn the voyage into a drunken 
pleasure cruise, and regard the true navigator as “a word-spinner and a star-gazer, of 
no use to them at all” [ibid., 488e]. 
 This, Plato implies, is the attitude of people in democracies towards 
Knowledge, and consequently towards Philosophers. They do not believe that 
knowledge is even possible and thus treat all opinions equally. Each member thinks 
they have a right to rule, even though they have no Knowledge of what ruling requires 
[ibid., 488b]. 
 Thus Plato argues that just as Justice in the soul requires that Reason should 
assert authority over the Spirited and Appetitive elements of the soul, so should 
Reason in the shape of the Philosopher Kings rule in society. Only in this way can the 
polis be guarded from the injustice and ignorance of citizens and politicians. 
 
If correct, then, Plato’s argument for aristocracy and against democracy might give us 
reason to prefer the former in decisions concerning rights, assuming of course that 
rights could be justified on the Platonic schema2. Aristocratic procedures will lead to 
decisions that are justified because they are based on the Knowledge of Forms that 
only Philosopher rulers can achieve. Democratically taken decisions, on the other 
hand, are likely to lead to an unjust society because they are based on opinions rather 
than Knowledge of what citizens’ rights should be. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Admittedly the idea that rights could be justified of the basis of Forms is an extremely unplatonic 
assumption, which will be discussed shortly. For the moment it is sufficient to note that my aim here is 
to ascertain the structure of justifications for undemocratic authorities, so the assumption is convenient, 
though not necessary to my argument. 
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2. Platonic Aristocracy and Metaphysical Objectivity 
As discussed above, Plato argued that Forms such as the Form of Justice exist 
independently of human thought. Just as he believes that the logical truths of 
mathematics can be ‘discovered’ through reasoning, so can moral laws about how 
individuals and societies ought to be.  
The concept of independently existing, or metaphysically objective values is 
relatively unpopular in modern philosophy. It is often regarded as a suspect and 
mysterious notion [Sayre-McCord, 3-4]. 
In addition, the advent of “reasonable pluralism” [Rawls (1993), 141] casts 
doubt on the idea that there is one independently existing conception of the Good that 
should be accepted. Rather, a plurality of reasonable conceptions of the good should 
be accommodated. 
The prevalence of the relativist and sceptical views contribute to the suspicion 
with which Plato’s metaphysical objectivity is treated. Moral relativists such as 
Gilbert Harman argue that 
[t]he truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute 
or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a 
group of persons [Gowans, Section 2]. 
 
Moral sceptics claim that “nobody is ever justified in holding any substantive moral 
belief” [Sinnott-Armstrong, Section 1]. Clearly if either of these metaethical theories 
is accepted then Plato’s claim that the Forms of Justice and Good are independently 
existing metaphysical entities must be abandoned. If moral relativists are correct, then 
it is false to claim that there is any universal independently existing morality to which 
only Philosophers can have access. Similarly, if no-one is justified in holding any 
moral belief, then it is impossible that Philosophers can possess greater knowledge 
than anyone else. 
 Thus if these claims are accepted then severe doubt is cast on the idea that 
there can be such a thing as a Philosopher in Plato’s sense and the idea that 
Philosophers should rule becomes a non sequitur. Since this is so, moral relativism 
and moral scepticism could provide a basis for the objections of proponents of 
MSDP3.  
                                                          
3 It should be noted that I have not claimed that either of these metaethical theories ought to be 
accepted, or that they would in fact provide a basis for the objections of proponents of MSDP. 
Nevertheless, these are possibilities that should be taken into account in justifications for non-
democratic authorities. I do so when I defend Liberal Aristocracy in §2.3.. 
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3. Platonic Aristocracy & Rights 
Earlier (§2.1.1) I assumed that rights could be justified on the basis of Plato’s theory 
of Forms. However, given Plato’s attitude towards democracy and the liberal basis of 
rights, this seems extremely doubtful. Plato explicitly rejects the liberal ideas that 
underlie justifications of rights, and sees them as closely related to the decline of 
democracy into tyranny [ibid., 562b-d]. Plato claims that the variety of views and 
characters that liberty makes possible, while ‘attractive’, lead to a decline of 
discipline, and an inability to distinguish right from wrong, necessary desires from 
unnecessary [ibid., 557a-e]. Consequently freedoms, such as the right to express 
potentially immoral views, are categorically rejected by Plato. Instead, education and 
the arts are to be strictly controlled [ibid., 376c-411e; 595a-608b]. Plato believed that 
if they were not, then rampant freedom will corrupt society by exposing citizens to 
damaging immoral views. 
 Thus because Plato disparages the liberal basis of rights, the assumption that 
Platonic Aristocracy will support citizens’ rights is almost certainly false. This 
provides further reason to reject Platonic Aristocracy as a suitable extra-democratic 
authority in matters concerning liberal rights. 
 
4. Structural Considerations 
Although Plato’s Aristocracy may be undesirable for the above reasons, this section 
has given an indication of what must be shown if an extra-democratic authority is to 
be justified. There are, I suggest, three structural considerations that must be taken 
into account if an extra-democratic authority is to be justified. 
 First, there must be a justificatory basis according to which rights will be 
accorded. In the Platonic case, I suggested that the theory of Forms might provide 
such a basis. However, I argued that it was problematic because it relied on the 
controversial idea that values exist independently of human thought, and because 
Plato explicitly rejected the liberal basis upon which rights are thought to be justified. 
 Second, an authority that will take decisions in accordance with the 
justificatory basis must be designated. In Plato’s argument Philosopher rulers were 
seen to be ideally suited because they had knowledge of Forms and thus would take 
the best decisions regarding rights (given the unlikely assumption that rights could be 
justified on the basis of Forms). 
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 Third, it must be shown that this authority is better qualified than all other 
citizens combined to make the correct decisions with regard to the justificatory basis. 
In the Platonic case, it followed directly from the first two aspects above that 
Philosopher Rulers would be better qualified. This is because their knowledge of 
Forms is far superior to the opinions of ordinary citizens. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this section I argued that Plato’s Aristocracy is an unsatisfactory candidate for 
making decisions concerning rights. This is because the existence of Philosopher 
Rulers depends crucially on the acceptance of a controversial metaethical theory that 
sees morality as existing independently of what people think. I argued, however, that 
Plato’s account yields three structural considerations must be taken into account when 
justifying an extra-democratic authority. These considerations will be shown to be 
relevant in the next section in which I discuss the liberal basis for attributing to 
Constitutional Court judges the power to revoke democratically taken decisions when 
they conflict with the Constitution. 
 
2.2. Liberal Justification & the Constitutional Court 
I now discuss a Rawls’s description of the liberal basis for attributing rights, and 
attempts to show that Constitutional Court Judges are qualified to annul decisions of 
democratic branches of government when they conflict with the Constitution4. I argue 
that they are not shown to be so qualified, and thus the third requirement above – that 
the external authority must be more qualified to take decisions than democratic 
branches – is not met. 
 
1. Rawls: Constitutional Courts & Public Values 
According to Rawls the task of the courts is to prevent the higher law exemplified by 
the Constitution from being eroded by ordinary laws that might otherwise be passed 
by democratic branches of government [Rawls (1993), 233]. This is done by granting 
the courts the power to review decisions of democratic branches of government and 
annul laws that they hold are in conflict with the Constitution or with the Bill of 
                                                          
4 I discuss Rawls’s account not because I see it as being correct in its entirety. Rather, I assume that this 
account, or similar to it, could provides an adequate basis for the justification of rights. 
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Rights5. So, for instance, if a democratic branch of government decided to disallow 
homosexual marriage or to reinstate the death penalty, or to restrict the franchise to a 
certain group of the population, the external authority could annul these decisions if 
they decided they conflicted with the Constitution. 
 In exercising their powers of review, Judges must not appeal to their own non-
public comprehensive doctrines. So, for instance they should not appeal to their own 
religious values, personal morality, or philosophical views. 
 Rather they must appeal to the political values they think belong to the most 
 reasonable understanding of the public conception and its political values of 
 justice and public reason. These are values that they believe in good 
 faith…that all citizens as reasonable and rational might reasonably be 
 expected to endorse [ibid., 236]. 
 
The reason for this is that Rawls believes that Constitutional provisions should be the 
subject of an “overlapping consensus” that takes into account the inevitable plurality 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Judges should not appeal to their own 
religious views because “a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the use of 
oppressive state power” [ibid., 37]. If, for instance, Judges’ decisions were decided 
purely in accordance with the Catholic faith, people who accepted other doctrines 
might reasonably reject their decrees, leading to civil strife and the use of state 
oppression. A conception of justice in a liberal democratic society must thus 
accommodate a plurality of reasonable doctrines, rather than enforcing one particular 
conception.  
 So instead of appealing to a single comprehensive doctrine, Rawls’s political 
liberalism aims to create an overlapping consensus which reasonable citizens can 
affirm from within their own reasonable doctrines. While the idea that everyone will 
reach agreement on all matters is unlikely in the extreme, Rawls believes that by 
appealing only to what their fellow citizens could reasonably be expected to endorse, 
Judges will be able to arrive at a public conception of justice. 
 These conditions do not impose the unrealistic – indeed the utopian – 
 requirement that all citizens will affirm the same comprehensive doctrine, but 
 only, as in political liberalism, the same public conception of justice 
 [ibid., 39]. 
 
                                                          
5 It should be noted that Rawls does not directly defend the practice of judicial review. Rather his aim 
is to provide guidelines that Judges should follow.  
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That is, people can accept that there will be disagreement as to what comprehensive 
doctrine to accept, but through appealing to what others can reasonably be expected to 
endorse, they will affirm a public conception of justice. So, for instance someone who 
accepts a reasonable Catholic doctrine might disagree with the view that churches 
should not be publicly funded. However, when she considers what is reasonable for 
those who hold other reasonable doctrines, she might agree that there are good 
reasons why churches should not be funded by the taxes of those who do not accept 
the Catholic faith. Thus by appealing to what all citizens should reasonably accept, 
those who affirm diverse non-public reasonable doctrines can arrive at an overlapping 
consensus of public values, even though there is intractable disagreement amongst the 
non-public reasonable doctrines themselves. 
 For these reasons, then, in deciding if democratic decisions are legitimate 
Judges must interpret the Constitution in a way that they believe is in keeping with 
what rational citizens could reasonably be expected to endorse. If, for example, a 
democratic government passes a law instating the death penalty, Constitutional Court 
judges should not base any revocation of the democratically created law on their own 
personal or religious view that the death penalty is immoral. Rather they must decide 
whether such a law is, say, consistent with an interpretation of “cruel and unusual 
punishment” that all citizens should reasonably endorse. 
 
Rawls’s view is attractive because it accommodates “reasonable pluralism” whilst still 
allowing for some consensus on basic rights and liberties, which “imply limits on the 
harms and losses that any individual or group may reasonably be expected to put up 
with” [Waldron, 400]. That is, it assumes that there will always be a plurality of 
reasonable religious, philosophical, and other non-public views, but holds that 
because these doctrines are reasonable, there will be some common ground that will 
form the basis of agreement on rights. 
 
2. Problems in Liberal Justifications  
Having outlined this prominent liberal account of the role of Constitutional Court 
Judges, I now discuss the extent to which liberal justifications fulfil the structural 
criteria gleaned from the discussion of Plato’s account (§2.1.4.).  
 Rawls’s description furnishes two of the three requirements for justifying 
extra-democratic authorities. First a justificatory basis is provided for decisions 
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concerning rights – decisions must be such that they would be endorsed by citizens as 
reasonable and rational. 
 Second, an authority is specified that will take decisions regarding rights. In 
Constitutional democracies the Court decides when decisions of democratic branches 
conflict with the Constitution and is granted the power to revoke such decisions 
accordingly. 
 However, when it comes to the third requirement there is a substantial gap, 
since it is unclear that the designated authority – Constitutional Court Judges – are 
especially qualified to take Constitutional decisions that accord with the liberal 
justificatory basis. That is, it is unclear that judges are more likely than democratic 
branches to make decisions with which reasonable and rational citizens should agree. 
Why should it be assumed that judges will arrive at decisions that are in concomitance 
with this principle, and why should it be assumed that democratic branches will not?  
 Ronald Dworkin, a fierce proponent of Judges’ power of judicial review, 
appears not to notice that these questions require answers. Indeed, at times he seems 
to be advancing the more negative claim that there is no reason not to rely on Judges 
decisions. So, for instance, he claims “there is no a priori reason to think [Judges] less 
competent political theorists than state legislators or attorneys general” [Dworkin, 
375]. That is, there is no reason to think the decisions of Judges are inferior with 
respect to public values than those of democratic branches of government. 
 At other times, however, Dworkin seems to suggest that democratic 
procedures are indeed likely to reach worse results than Constitutional Court Judges. 
He claims for instance that the “United States is a more just society than it would have 
been had its constitutional rights been left to the conscience of majoritarian 
institutions” [ibid., 356]. However, he admits that he offers “no argument for this flat 
claim”, suggesting that a further book would be necessary to do so [ibid., 449]. As I 
have claimed, though, without such an argument it is difficult to see why 
Constitutional Court Judges should be seen as qualified to revoke the decisions of 
democratic branches of government. 
  
3. Conclusion 
Clearly further argument is required in order to justify Constitutional Courts Judges’ 
power to undermine the decisions of democratic branches of government. It must be 
shown that Constitutional Court Judges could be sufficiently qualified to make 
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decisions with which reasonable citizens should agree. If they cannot then the danger 
of incorrect decisions as to citizens’ rights is not shown to be less pronounced than it 
would be if democratic decisions were unconstrained by the extra-democratic 
authority of the Courts. Furthermore, it must be shown that democratic procedures are 
less likely to arrive at such decisions, because if democratic and Judicial procedures 
are equally likely to arrive at the right decisions, then there is no substantive reason to 
prefer either. The absence of these claims in liberal justifications is extremely 
significant. Unless their truth is demonstrated, the third requirement of justifying 
extra-democratic authorities is not met and it remains possible that in Constitutional 
democracies democratic decisions will arbitrarily be held hostage by the decisions of 
an unqualified minority. 
 In order to show that Constitutional Court Judges could be qualified to make 
decisions that reasonable citizens should endorse, I advance what I will refer to as 
Liberal Aristocracy. Liberal Aristocracy rests on a conception of ideal judges as being 
‘moral experts’, in a sense to be defended in the next section. I argue that moral 
experts will make the best justified decisions with regard to citizens’ rights and duties, 
and that such decisions should secure the agreement of reasonable citizens in society. 
In this way the third requirement above is partially fulfilled because the designated 
extra-democratic authority is indeed qualified to take decisions with regard to the 
liberal justificatory basis. I say partially fulfilled because a further argument is 
required to the effect that democratic procedures are less likely than Liberal 
Aristocracy to reach decisions with which all reasonable citizens should agree. 
Without this further claim the extra-democratic authority, though qualified, might still 
be unnecessary because rights could be adequately protected by democratic voting 
 
2.3. Liberal Aristocracy 
The term ‘aristocracy’ – meaning rule by the virtuous – is usually not well-received. 
Unfortunately it has often been used as an epithet for unjust systems of rule such as 
monarchic dictatorship based on the ‘divine right of kings’. More recently, it has been 
applied satirically in describing Constitutional Courts. ‘Judicial Aristocracy’, it is 
claimed, illegitimately and unjustifiably undermines democratic sovereignty [North, 
168]. The usage of the term ‘aristocracy’ may thus immediately be seen as counseling 
against the solution I propose to the problem facing justifications of Judges’ extra-
democratic authority. 
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 However, I think the negative connotations of this term, combined with the 
almost universal acclamation of democracy, are partly to blame for the lack of 
satisfactory justifications for the power of Constitutional Court Judges. Theorists 
seem to be prevented from completing their justification of the power of 
Constitutional Courts by the apprehension that this would invite an unwelcome 
comparison with much maligned aristocratic systems of rule. More precisely, theorists 
seem unwilling to suggest that a minority of Judges could have a capacity that 
qualifies them to make collectively binding decisions – a capacity that the demos in 
general does not possess. This, at least, is one way to explain the incompleteness of 
justifications for the extra-democratic authority of the Courts discussed in §2.2.2.. 
 Liberal Aristocracy acknowledges that if the authority of an extra-democratic 
minority is to be justified, then it must be shown that this authority possesses a skill or 
qualification that most citizens do not possess. I claim that ‘moral expertise’ is such a 
qualification. 
 
I define Liberal Aristocracy as entailing procedures in which Judges possessing moral 
expertise make collectively binding decisions. In relation to constitutional democracy, 
then, moral experts can decide that a democratically created law is in breach of the 
Constitution and thus revoke it. 
 In this section I present a definition of ideal Constitutional Judges as 
possessing moral expertise, and claim that the possession of this expertise qualifies 
Judges to make decisions that accord with Rawls’s justificatory basis. However, I will 
suggest that, as in Plato’s account, the possibility of possessing the required 
qualification could be challenged by the claims of moral relativists and moral 
sceptics. However, I argue that the claims of moral relativists can be accommodated, 
and that those of moral sceptics would be self-defeating for advocates of MSDP.  
 Having shown this, I discuss an objection to the effect that it would be 
impossible to tell whether a Judge was a moral expert without being an expert oneself. 
I claim that this is not the case, since one could identify a moral expert on the basis of 
their past achievements. 
 Thus the first problem is surmounted, since Constitutional Court Judges with 
moral expertise are shown to be qualified to make decisions with which reasonable 
citizens should agree.  
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1. Moral Expertise 
Hooker defines a moral expert as one who  
 might be expected to provide arguments which, if examined carefully, would 
 persuade reasonable people and produce convergence in their moral views 
 [Hooker, 510].  
 
A person with moral expertise, then, is one who has the best justification for her 
moral views6. This definition coincides to an extent with Rawls’s conception of what 
Constitutional Judges should do. That is, they should make judgements that all 
reasonable citizens would endorse. A Judge who possessed moral expertise would 
thus be in an ideal position to make decisions with which reasonable citizens should 
agree.  
 Earlier (§2.1.2) the idea that Philosophers were qualified to rule was seen to 
rely on the independent existence of metaphysical Forms. I argued that the objections 
of moral relativists and moral sceptics, if correct, undermined Platonic Aristocracy. I 
now claim that Liberal Aristocracy could stand up to these objections if they were 
raised by a proponent of MSDP. 
 
2. Liberal Aristocracy & Relativism  
Moral relativism can be defined as the view that  
 [t]he truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute 
 or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a 
 group of persons. [Gowans, Section 2]. 
 
Harman, for instance, holds that “the relevant motivating reasons are not universal 
and so probably arose from an agreement that some but not all persons have made” 
[ibid.]. That is, some groups might have in some sense ‘agreed’ to be motivated by 
certain reasons or types of reason that other groups or societies have not agreed to. As 
such, groups that have not ‘agreed’ to be motivated by these reasons will not accept 
moral experts’ justification on the basis of these reasons. Since different reasons 
might be agreed to be acceptable in different societies, claims that are justified in one 
society might not be justified in another.  
 So for instance one society might ‘agree’ that for something to be considered 
cruel it must be done to a human. People in such a society might thus not frown upon 
torturing animals, whereas people in a society that believed the term ‘cruel’ could 
                                                          
6 I will expand on this definition when I discuss the problem of identifying moral experts in §2.3.4.. 
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apply to the treatment of animals might be repulsed by the idea that torturing animals 
could be acceptable. 
Moral relativist claims such as Harman’s provide opponents of MSDP with an 
objection to Hooker’s definition of a moral expert as one whose arguments would 
produce convergence in the moral views of all reasonable people. This is because, 
according to moral relativists, it is reasonable for some groups to disagree with 
arguments that would be accepted by all reasonable members of another group. A 
moral claim can be true in one society and false in another. On this view, then, it is 
impossible for anyone to have moral expertise, since no matter how strong the 
argument offered is, it might be reasonable for some groups or societies to reject it. 
Thus, if Hooker’s definition is accepted and if moral relativism is correct, moral 
expertise is indeed impossible. 
Rather than discussing the tenability of moral relativist claims, I argue that 
Hooker’s definition of moral expertise can be revised such that expertise is possible, 
even if moral relativism is accepted. 
Importantly, unlike many moral sceptics, moral relativists generally do not 
deny that particular moral claims can be more or less justified. That is, although they 
claim that moral judgements cannot be universally justified, they do not deny that 
moral judgments can be justified within a particular society or group. Moral views can 
still have better or worse justification, although that justification will be relative to a 
particular group or society. I thus propose the following revised definition of a moral 
expert. 
 A moral expert is one who might be expected to provide arguments that, if 
 examined carefully, would persuade reasonable people within a particular 
 society and produce convergence in their moral views. 
According to this definition, it is possible that a person can be a moral expert in a 
particular society if her arguments, once carefully scrutinised, would produce 
convergence in the moral views of the reasonable people of that society 7 . For 
instance, in a society that accepted liberal values, moral experts would provide 
                                                          
7 This revised definition of moral expertise is more in keeping with Rawls’s idea that the decisions 
regarding basic rights and liberties should accord with public values, rather than with one’s own view 
of the whole truth [ibid., 216]. 
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arguments that consistently accorded with liberal morality8. Thus moral expertise is 
possible even if the claims of moral relativists are correct. 
 
However, it could be objected that the acceptance of moral relativism might mean that 
a particular society does not accept justification at all, and in such a society the 
possibility of expertise would be ruled out altogether. However, insofar as this 
possibility arises, my next argument holds that such a claim would also refute the idea 
that matters concerning rights should be decided democratically. The proponent of 
MSDP cannot raise this possibility as an objection to Liberal Aristocracy, since to do 
so would be self-defeating. 
 
3. Liberal Aristocracy, Scepticism, & MSDP 
Epistemological moral sceptics hold that “nobody is ever justified in holding any 
substantive moral belief” [Sinnott-Armstrong, Section 1]. Since no moral belief is 
justified, no moral view can be considered to be more correct than any other. Clearly 
this presents a problem for the possibility of moral expertise, since if no moral claim 
is more justified than any other, then it is not the case that reasonable people should 
be convinced by any moral argument. One person’s moral beliefs are just as good as 
anyone else’s. On this view then, there can be no moral experts because there is no 
reason to believe that the claims of some people are any more justified than the claims 
of anyone else. 
 Rather than arguing directly that some views can be more justified than others, 
I claim that the proponent of MSDP must accept that there are differential levels of 
justification because to suggest otherwise would be self-defeating. To illustrate this 
point I examine an argument for MSDP on the basis that there are no justified moral 
claims, and show that it, and arguments like it must necessarily be self-refuting. 
Proponents of the idea that democratic procedures ought to be used to decide in all 
matters concerning rights must thus accept that we can be more or less justified in 
accepting moral claims.  
 The argument from a lack of accessible moral truth to the value of democracy 
can be briefly put as follows. If there are no accessible values, then any person’s 
                                                          
8 In the next chapter this will be shown to require that Judges make decisions that enable and facilitate 
deliberation (§3.1 & §3.3.2), and which protect or maximise citizens’ autonomy in the private sphere 
(§3.2.3). 
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opinion is as good or as bad as the opinion of any other person. Since all opinions are 
equally valid, then we should tolerate the opinions of all people equally. We should 
thus allow each individual an equal say in government. Thus democracy is a better 
form of government, since it gives everyone an equal say in what decisions are made 
[Harrison, 149]. 
 As Harrison notes, however, the move from scepticism about moral truth and 
justification to the rightness of democracy is illicit. One moves from a denial that we 
can have knowledge of the truth or falsity of moral claims to an acknowledgement of 
the truth of a particular moral claim. If one accepts moral scepticism one denies that 
we can have knowledge of moral value. One cannot on this basis suggest that we 
ought to tolerate one another’s opinions because to do so is to accept a moral claim9. 
The moral principle of tolerance is both denied and accepted by the argument, which 
is clearly inconsistent. Thus the democrat cannot consistently hold both that there are 
no justifiable moral beliefs and that democratic procedures are morally justifiable, 
since to do so is self-defeating [ibid.; 150-1]. The possibility of moral justification is a 
shared premise in moral arguments for democratic procedures and in arguments for 
aristocratic ones10. 
 Similarly, if, as the sceptic holds, no-one can be shown to be right or wrong, 
justified or unjustified, then one could not be said to be mistaken if one held views 
that would obviously be rejected by democrats [ibid.]. A sceptical democrat could not, 
for instance, have any grounds for disagreeing with one who believes that the weak 
should be enslaved, or that opinions in opposition to their own should be suppressed. 
On the sceptical account such claims are as (un)justified as MSDP itself. Thus the 
proponent of MSDP cannot defeat the possibility of moral expertise by resorting to 
scepticism and claiming that there are no accessible or justifiable moral truths, since 
to do so is self-defeating. 
 Referring back to the problem that arose when I considered the possibility that 
a particular society rejected justification altogether (§2.3.2.), it is now clear that 
members of such a society could not advocate MSDP on this basis. Again, without 
any justification, MSDP would be no more or less justifiable than any other moral 
claim. 
                                                          
9 One could presumably make some sort of pragmatic argument that tolerance leads to a more stable 
society or some such. However, this would not be a defense of MSDP since MSDP holds that 
democratic procedures are morally superior to aristocratic procedures. 
10 This also means that a democrat could not object to Plato’s account on sceptical grounds. 
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 I have argued that once the definition of a moral expert is modified, moral 
expertise is possible even if we accept the claims of moral relativists. What moral 
relativism entails is that an expert’s expertise might be limited to a particular group or 
society. To the extent that a society does have justified moral beliefs, then, there can 
indeed be moral experts whose arguments are the most justified in that society. 
Thereafter, I argued that for the proponent of MSDP to object that no moral beliefs 
are more or less justified than any other would be self-defeating, since MSDP would 
be as unjustified as any other moral claim. 
 Thus the metaethical problems that were shown to cast dispersions on Plato’s 
account do not pose similar problems for Liberal Aristocracy. Unlike Plato’s 
Philosopher kings, moral experts do not require access to an independently existing 
realm of Forms. All that is required is that they can construct arguments that would 
produce moral convergence if the reasonable people of a particular society considered 
such arguments carefully11.  
 
4. An Objection: Identifying Experts 
One objection to the claim that Liberal Aristocracy is possible is that although, as I 
have argued, Judges could have moral expertise, it would be impossible to know 
whether they were experts without already knowing what they know. That is, it is 
impossible to be an expert without being an expert oneself. I explain this objection 
and the problem that it raises for Liberal Aristocracy. In response I claim that it is 
possible to identify experts based on their track record of providing arguments that 
should bring about convergence in the moral views of reasonable people. 
 
A problem that is often raised in relation to moral expertise is that it is difficult or 
impossible to be sure who the experts are. It might be claimed that someone could 
prove their moral expertise by producing convergence in all the moral views of all 
reasonable people that carefully considered their arguments.  
 However, there is an immediate objection to this idea because if moral experts 
produced arguments which reasonable people understood and agreed to, then the 
people who understood and agreed with the arguments would presumably be able to 
reproduce the arguments themselves. In this case they would be moral experts, since 
                                                          
11 Note that this does not require that all reasonable people actually do agree with the arguments, just 
that they would agree if they gave sufficient consideration to the arguments. 
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they have the capacity to produce moral arguments that secure convergence in 
people’s views [Hooker, 510]. 
 Here there appears to be a regress of justification, since only those who 
already possess moral expertise are able to identify moral experts. That is, the only 
way anyone could know who the moral experts were would be to possess their 
expertise [Harrison, 153]. If it is only possible to identify a moral expert by becoming 
an expert, then it is unjustified for anyone who is not a moral expert to accept that 
anyone else is an expert. If so, there would be no reason for non-moral experts to 
accept that Judges who claimed to be moral experts should have the power to revoke 
the decisions of democratic branches of government.  
 
A potential solution might be for those who recognise themselves as moral experts to 
make a self-validating move, and claim that those who do not recognise their 
expertise are unreasonable and should not be a hindrance to aristocratic decision-
making. That is, those who recognise that their moral views should be accepted might 
simply proclaim themselves to be moral experts and demand the power to make 
collectively binding decisions. However, as Dahl notes,  
[b]acked up by the force of the state, this move can effectively put down 
critics. Backed up only by the force of reason… a move of this kind fails to 
win credibility [Dahl, 349]. 
 
Such a strategy is common in totalitarian regimes: ideologues will proclaim to have 
the ‘true’ theory of justice, and use the state’s power to suppress ‘unreasonable’ and 
‘false’ opinions in opposition to their own. As a justification for authority this strategy 
is hopelessly circular. It amounts to saying “you’re wrong because I’m right”. Clearly 
an alternative solution must be found. 
 
Perhaps the above problem can be drawn out with an example of another type of 
expertise. I want to plan a new house for myself, but I want to be sure that the 
architect I hire is an expert. Say the definition of an architectural expert is one who 
can produce great architecture on a regular basis. In order to be sure that he is an 
expert I go to all the buildings he has built. They look good to me, but how can I be 
sure that they are great architecture? Perhaps I can consult another expert, but this 
leads to a regress: how am I to find out if other purported experts are indeed experts? 
The only way I can find out if these people are experts seems to be to become an 
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expert architect myself. Then when I see another architect’s building I will be able to 
tell whether or not it is great architecture.  
 The same seems to be the case with moral expertise. In order to know that a 
person is a moral expert, I must understand the arguments that they understand, in 
which case it seems I have moral expertise. 
 
Returning again to the architectural analogy, let us say that in order to recognise great 
architecture I must know the precise details of how a particular structure was 
designed. I must be able to understand the placement of each doorway and staircase. 
Having understood all this I am able to perfectly reproduce the building and know 
how all the pieces fit together. Given these skills I might be able to recognise other 
pieces of great architecture, and see how the elements of design fit perfectly together. 
But this surely does not entail that I would be able to produce great architecture 
myself. I might be able to reproduce the great architecture that I have studied 
carefully, but it would be a mistake to think that this automatically makes me an 
architectural expert who can produce new architectural structures on a regular basis.  
 
Similarly, in order to identify a moral expert I need to recognise when an argument is 
reasonable. Since the ability to understand reasons is a basic capacity of persons 
(unlike the capacity to recognise great architecture) if citizens carefully consider 
arguments we will be able to recognise those arguments with which we should 
reasonably agree. This does not, however, mean that we will be able to produce such 
arguments on a regular basis. This points to a further capacity that is required in order 
to be a moral expert. One must have  
 a capacity or disposition to … form true answers to new questions that may be 
 posed in the domain. An expert has the (cognitive) know-how, when 
 presented with a new question in the domain, to go to the right sectors of 
 [her] information-bank and perform appropriate operations on this 
 information; or to deploy some external apparatus or data-banks to  disclose 
 relevant material [Goldman, 145]. 
 
Put in less jargonistic terms, Judges’ moral expertise consists in their being able to 
apply their expertise when new problems arise. While reasonable people are able to 
understand their arguments, they are not necessarily able to produce arguments 
themselves. Such a capacity may require much training, knowledge of judicial 
precedent, and an ability to put one’s own private opinions to one side (as discussed in 
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§2.2.1.). While the end result might be an argument with which reasonable people 
should agree, this is a far cry from saying that those who understand the arguments 
can produce such arguments whenever a new problem arises. 
 The above objection, then, relies on a confusion between the ability to 
reproduce arguments already provided as solutions to previous problems, and the 
ability to provide arguments when new situations or problems require it. It is the latter 
capacity that makes it possible to identify moral experts. 
 
This consideration paves the way for a solution to the problem of identifying experts. 
Given the definition of expertise above, I argue that we can know who moral experts 
are without knowing everything that they know. The definition states that a moral 
expert can be “expected to provide arguments which, if examined carefully, would 
persuade reasonable people within a particular society and produce convergence in 
their moral views.” To recognise such a person it is not necessary that one knows all 
the arguments she has made or ever will make. 
 We can recognise an expert architect on the basis of her track record. The 
more great architecture she creates, the greater the extent that we can say with 
confidence that she has expertise. Similarly, we can identify a moral expert without 
possessing her expertise. The greater the regularity with which a person has produced 
arguments upon which all reasonable people should agree, the greater the extent to 
which we can be confident of her moral expertise. Just as we do not have to know of 
all the buildings that an architect has designed or ever will design in order to be 
confident that she is an expert architect, neither do we need to be aware of the entire 
contents of an expert’s knowledge in order to be confident of her moral expertise12.  
 One further example may clarify this point. Say Socrates spends his life 
walking about Athens and discussing various moral claims with many reasonable 
people. All of these reasonable people – Thrasymachus, Glaucon, Meno, and many 
more people of all ages and financial brackets – come away saying that Socrates has 
convinced them about various moral claims. It seems clear that we would not be 
unjustified in claiming that Socrates is a moral expert, even though we would shy 
away from attributing this title to people like Glaucon, Thasymachus, and Meno13. It 
                                                          
12 Similar arguments are offered by A. O. Rorty [Rorty, 169]. 
13 I am not claiming that Socrates is a moral expert. In fact it is apparent that many people in his society 
did not agree with his moral arguments, since he was found guilty of corrupting the youth. 
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would thus be justified for non-moral experts to accept that an individual is indeed a 
moral expert on the basis of that individual’s track record of producing convergence 
in people’s moral views. 
Thus the regress of justification described above can be avoided, since it is 
possible to identify experts on the basis of their track record of producing arguments 
that should secure reasonable agreement. This said, it is clear that Judges are in an 
excellent position to be identified as moral experts because throughout their career 
they are required to justify their decisions, providing reasons as to why a particular 
decision was taken. By examining the reasons that they give it is possible to say 
whether such reasons and the judgements that result should be endorsed by people in 
a particular society, or whether the judge is deciding in accordance with non-public 
doctrines that other citizens need not endorse. If their judgements are consistently of 
the former type, one can say with confidence that a judge has moral expertise, and 
instate her as a Constitutional Court Judge on this basis14. 
 
5. Conclusion 
To conclude this section, then, the gap that was shown to exist in liberal justifications 
of the role of Constitutional Court Judges is partially filled. Judges who possess moral 
expertise are indeed qualified to make decisions that all citizens as reasonable and 
rational might be expected to endorse15. Thus if the decisions of democratic branches 
conflict with the reasonable principles of the Constitution, Judges with moral 
expertise are well-situated to review and revoke such decisions. 
 However, if Judges’ moral expertise is not to be redundant it must be shown 
that democratic procedures are less likely to achieve the moral end of securing 
citizens’ rights. If not, then the role of Constitutional Courts is unnecessary. In the 
next section I claim that Constitutional Court Judges could play a valuable part in 
securing citizens’ rights because without this external authority the decisions of 
democratic branches will sometimes lead to violation of citizens’ rights. 
 
                                                          
14 It is unnecessary to go into details as to how the selection of Constitutional Court Judges’ would 
occur. Presumably, though, the selection committees would be made up of reasonable people with 
sufficient time and training to carefully examine judges’ careers. 
15 Note that I have not argued that existing Constitutional Court Judges are moral experts. If they are 
not, then their authority is not necessarily justified by the argument for Liberal Aristocracy. However, I 
think it is likely that they posses moral expertise to a large degree. As such, the argument of the next 
section – that democratic procedures will infringe upon citizens’ rights – would still lend some 
justification to the authority of existing Constitutional Court Judges. 
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2.4. Liberal Aristocracy, Democracy, & Moral Ends 
In this section I examine arguments to the effect that democratic procedures are more 
likely than Liberal Aristocratic procedures to arrive at decisions that infringe on 
citizens’ rights. That is, I claim that Constitutional Court Judges with moral expertise 
will protect citizens’ rights to a greater extent than democratic procedures would. 
 Generally, such claims rely on a Benthamite conception of democracy and 
argue that interest-based voting is likely to lead to the infringement of citizens’ rights. 
Following Waldron, I claim that this is a somewhat pessimistic view of democracy. 
Democratic procedures can be viewed more optimistically when they are considered 
in a Rousseauian way, such that citizens vote towards the common good, and not 
purely on the basis of narrow self-interest. Furthermore, the equations of Condorcet 
suggest that, given certain assumptions, citizens are likely to be right about the 
common good. However, I argue that these assumptions are implausible. Since this is 
the case, even the more flattering Rousseauian picture of democracy cannot justify the 
claim that democratic procedures are likely to be correct about what rights should be 
afforded to citizens. I thus conclude that democratic decisions are more likely to 
violate citizens’ rights than justified decisions of moral experts. 
 
1. Utilitarian Democracy 
Rawls suggests that part of the role of Constitutional Courts “is to prevent [the] law 
from being eroded by the legislation of transient majorities” [Rawls (1993), 233]. But 
why should we think that the law and in particular the Constitution should be 
protected from democracy? This question is easily answered if democracy is viewed 
in a Benthamite way. As a psychological egoist, Bentham argued that when people go 
to the polls they necessarily vote in a self-interested fashion. If people vote for a 
representative, they will vote for the person most likely to pass laws that are in their 
interest. Thus, when votes are counted, the decision that is taken will be the one that 
maximises utility. In this way democracy will produce the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number.  
 This view of democracy naturally opens itself up to the objection that 
democracy will lead to a ‘tyranny of the majority’. This is because it could be in the 
majority’s interests to enslave or tyrannise minority groups. Mill, for instance 
suggests that one of the greatest dangers of democracy 
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 lies in the sinister interest of the holders of power: it is the danger of class 
 legislation; of government intended for… the immediate benefit of the  
 dominant class, to the lasting detriment of the whole [Mill, 245]. 
 
So for instance, when the poor are in the majority it might be in their interests to 
reallocate the wealth of the rich and leave the formerly wealthy class with insufficient 
means for survival. Or, again, it might be in the interests of the majority to torture 
suspected terrorists, in which case the rights of individuals suspected of terrorism will 
be severely undermined. For Mill, then, a system of representative democracy ought 
not to be constituted such that one sectional interest comes to dominate over “truth 
and justice and other sectional interests combined” [ibid., 246]16. Without such a 
constitution it is easy to see that if voting takes place on purely self-interested lines 
there is a high chance that individual rights will be undermined. 
 
2. Democracy & the Common Good 
In “Rights and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited”, Waldron contrasts this utilitarian 
conception of democracy with the Rousseauian democratic ideal. He claims that the 
Rousseauian schema offers a more attractive competitor to the Interest Satisfaction 
model of democracy. Rousseau argued that citizens should vote according to their 
belief in the common good, and not according to their own interests [Waldron, 398]17. 
Thus if liberal theorists are correct and respecting individual rights is seen as being an 
important component of a good society, then citizens will vote having already taken 
the rights and interests of others into account. So, for instance, if we were to vote on 
whether suspected terrorists should be detained and tortured, we should vote 
considering the rights of terrorists, rather than merely voting for the policy that is in 
our interest. Thus 
 [p]rovided that the opinion that is acted on takes my interests, along with 
 everyone else’s, properly into account, the fact that the opinion is not mine is 
 not itself a threat to my freedom or well-being [ibid., 413]. 
                                                          
16 This requirement coincides roughly with Rawls’s idea that public policy should not be created on the 
basis of particular reasonable doctrines (§2.2.3). 
17 Waldron notes that the common good is a rather vague concept in Rousseau’s theory [Waldron, 399]. 
Rawls, however, believes that the requirement that decisions should conform to the common good 
shares similarities with his idea that decisions must be made on the basis that they should be endorsed 
by all reasonable citizens [Rawls (1993), 219-220]. I assume Rawls’s definition approximates the 
requirements of the common good and use the term ‘common good’ as an abbreviation. 
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Thus fears of majority tyranny and the subversion of individual rights need not arise 
on the Rousseauian view of democracy, provided it can be shown that citizens are 
likely to be correct about the rights of minorities. If, however, democratic voting is 
not as likely to reach the most justified decisions about citizens’ rights, then even if 
democracy is viewed in a Rousseauian way, Liberal Aristocratic procedures are 
necessary so as to prevent encroachments on citizens’ rights. 
  
3. Condorcet & the Epistemic Conception of Democracy 
I will refer to the idea that democracy will arrive at the correct decisions with regard 
to citizens’ rights as the ‘epistemic conception of democracy’. Why should we think 
that the most popular opinion is likely to be the right one? Waldron suggests that the 
only convincing argument to this effect is based on Condorcet’s equations. Condorcet 
argued that, given certain assumptions, the decisions of all citizens taken together are 
most likely to be right [Wolff (1996), 82]. I will briefly explain this argument and the 
assumptions on which it is based. 
 Condorcet demonstrated that if there is a voting body of 1000, and each 
member of a community is likely to be right 51% of the time, a 51% majority is likely 
to be right 69% of the time. That is, if citizens are on average more likely to be right 
than not, a majority is extremely likely to be right. Further, as the number of voters 
increases, so does the probability of the outcome being correct [Quinton, 122]. So if 
most people are more likely to be right than wrong it is better to have more voters, 
rather than fewer. With a large number of voters who are more than half likely to be 
correct about whether citizens should have particular right, democratic procedures are 
extremely likely to reach the correct decisions. Thus if citizens vote on which policy 
best promotes the common good, the decision they arrive at is extremely likely to be 
the correct one. 
 The implication of this is that there should be more decision-makers rather 
than fewer, and thus that a fully inclusive democratic procedure is just as likely to 
reach the correct answers as Judges with moral expertise. 
 
4. Objections to the Epistemic Conception 
There are, however, two central assumptions in the above argument that will often be 
false. The first is that (i) each member of the community is likely to be right about 
moral matters more than half the time. The second assumption is that (ii) the body of 
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voters will cast their vote according to what they think is morally right. Condorcet 
himself was of the opinion that as the size of the electorate increases the average 
individual competence will drop below 50%. If so, then even if everyone is voting 
towards the common good the equations will work the other way. That is, if people 
are only 49% likely to be right, a majority of 51% is 69% likely to be wrong. Further, 
as the majority of incorrect voters increases, so does the likelihood that they will 
undermine citizens’ rights. This means that if either (i) or (ii) is false, the chances that 
democratic voting will reach the correct decisions decreases drastically and 
Condorcet’s equations act as an argument against democracy. I will discuss these 
claims in turn, providing reasons as to why each is unlikely to be true in many cases. 
  
There are good reasons to doubt that the idea that citizens are likely to be right on 
moral issues will be true in all or most cases. One such reason is the phenomenon of 
false consciousness. False consciousness occurs where truth is concealed by 
appearances or circumstances [Mill, 512]. So for instance Mill argued that the fact 
that there were few women authors was actually due to the fact that women are denied 
access to education, and not, as was widely thought at the time, due to women’s 
innate intellectual inferiority [ibid., 512-520]. Similarly the opinion that black people 
are innately prone to criminal behaviour could be inferred from statistics, whereas in 
fact such statistics should be attributed to the fact that blacks often have lower income 
levels due to a history of oppression. Clearly in these cases false claims about reality 
are inferred from appearances. Because this is so, when citizens vote on a particular 
issue, false consciousness could negatively impact on their decisions. For instance, 
false consciousness undoubtedly played a role in the election of Adolf Hitler in 1933. 
Citizens inferred from the fact that many Jews were wealthy that Jews had capitalised 
from the German defeat in the First World War. On this basis many German citizens 
voted for the anti-Semitic National Socialists. Obviously there were additional factors 
involved here, such as manipulative propaganda campaigns. However, the point is 
that false consciousness clearly contributed to Hitler’s election and its disastrous 
consequences. False consciousness is thus one reason to doubt that citizens are likely 
to be correct about citizens’ rights and the common good. 
 A further consideration is that the likelihood that each citizen is likely to be 
correct about the common good decreases as the number and complexity of 
competing options increases [Christiano, 165]. When it comes to considering 
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problems such as the death penalty or abortion, numerous complex and conflicting 
arguments are offered. How, for instance should the foetus’s ‘right to life’ be weighed 
against a woman’s right to choose? Should the same ‘right to life’ be accorded to a 
person who has shown disrespect for another’s life by committing murder? In such 
cases it seems highly improbable that each citizen is more than likely to come to a 
decision that gives adequate weight to the best arguments, especially when one 
considers that often people do not have the time, the training, or the desire to do so. 
 Thus the first assumption above – that citizens are more than half likely to be 
right – will not be true in many instances. As noted, where citizens’ odds of being 
right are less than half, democratic voting is extremely likely to lead to results that 
infringe on citizens’ rights. 
 
The second assumption of the epistemic conception of democracy – that citizens will 
vote according to what they believe is for the common good – is equally questionable. 
In his criticism of Benthamite democracy Waldron notes that 
if large numbers of the community are voting  [on the basis of what they think 
the aggregate happiness demands] and some are voting selfishly, adding those 
votes together is like adding chalk and cheese. And if all are voting selflessly 
on the basis of their personal perceptions of the general welfare, we have no 
aggregative reason for thinking the majority decision tells us anything new at 
all [Waldron, 397]. 
 
That is, if voting is ‘mixed’, such that some people vote their interests and others vote 
on moral grounds, it gives no indication of what decision would maximise utility.  
However, Waldron appears not to notice that the problem of mixed voting applies to 
the Rousseauian model he advocates. Once again, if some people vote their interests 
and others vote for the common good, there is little reason to think that the result of 
voting will be the decision that best approximates the common good. The odds that 
the decision will be the moral one are decreased. The proponents of both Interest 
Satisfaction and Rousseauian models must thus hold that votes will not be mixed in 
the sense described. Clearly this is an implausible assumption. It is unlikely in the 
extreme that all citizens will vote according to their idea of the common good. People 
will often vote on self-interested grounds. 
 Say, for instance, that the Constitution stipulates a fair distribution of 
resources. If citizens were to vote on what such a fair distribution would be, it is likely 
that voting would be mixed. If I am rich I am less likely to accept a scheme that is 
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going to redistribute my amassed wealth. If I am poor I might vote for a redistribution 
scheme that will benefit me.  
 In addition many people are likely to vote on emotional grounds, without 
having considered whether or not a particular decision would violate individual rights. 
For instance, a commonly given justification for advocating the death penalty is ‘if 
someone killed someone in my family I’d want them to die’. Such emotional 
justification seems unsuited to making decisions with regard to basic rights and 
liberties. 
 In some cases at least, then, it is implausible that all, or even most people will 
vote according to their beliefs about what it is reasonable for other citizens to accept. 
Where this is so, the odds that democratic procedures will protect citizens’ rights are 
even further reduced. This consideration provides another reason to reject the claim 
that democratic procedures will arrive at decisions that are as justifiable as the 
justified decisions of Judges with moral expertise. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have not argued that democratic voting necessarily leads to decisions that would 
undermine citizens’ rights. Such a claim is itself implausible. The argument above 
does not dispute the idea that democratic decisions will often be right. Rather, it holds 
that two assumptions at the heart of the epistemic conception of democracy will be 
false in some cases. In some cases people are likely to be wrong about what rights 
citizens should have, and in some cases citizens will vote without considering what 
rights others should have. In such eventualities democratic voting potentially leads to 
decisions that undermine citizens’ rights. 
 This claim is sufficient for my purposes since it demonstrates that, even if 
democratic decisions are often for the common good, sometimes they will conflict 
with the reasonable provisions of the Constitution and undermine the rights of 
citizens. By contrast the decisions of Liberal Aristocratic procedures will conform to 
public principles and values, and be based on arguments that should secure reasonable 
agreement if they are carefully considered. They will thus support the end of 
sustaining citizens’ rights to a greater extent than democratic procedures. 
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2.5. Moral Ends - Conclusion 
In §2.1 and §2.2 I claimed that existing arguments for extra-democratic authorities are 
flawed. Platonic Aristocracy was seen to rest on a metaethical theory that is 
controversial and which is likely to undermine liberal rights. Liberal justifications for 
the power of Constitutional Court Judges were shown to be incomplete because they 
did not postulate a sufficiently qualified extra-democratic authority, or show that 
democratic authorities were so unqualified as to warrant external restrictions. 
 In S2.3 I attempted to supplement the liberal justification of the Constitutional 
Court’s authority by claiming that moral expertise qualifies Judges to make decisions 
that protect citizens’ rights. This is because they will provide judgements that all 
citizens should reasonably endorse, and which could be the focus of an overlapping 
consensus. §2.4 completed the justification for extra-democratic authority of 
Constitutional Court Judges because it was argued that without Liberal Aristocratic 
intervention democratic decisions are likely to undermine the moral end of preserving 
citizens’ rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: MORAL MEANS 
 
In the previous chapter, I claimed that Liberal Aristocracy would lead to decisions 
that are the most justified in a particular society. I now turn to the question of whether 
Liberal Aristocracy can be a morally legitimate means of making collectively binding 
decisions. Waldron notes that to “ask whether a political decision is legitimate is to 
ask a more procedural question; it is to ask whether it was taken in the way that such 
decisions ought to be taken” [Waldron, 393].  
 Democratic procedures are usually argued to be legitimate on the basis of 
liberal values such as equality and autonomy. Furthermore, it is usually held that they 
are the only procedures that are legitimate on this basis. Thus non-democratic 
procedures in which some or most of the demos are excluded from participation in 
collectively binding decisions are thought to be morally unconscionable. This is not 
because democratic procedures arrive at the best decisions as to how liberal ends such 
as autonomy should be furthered18. Rather, it is because democratic procedures are 
argued to be the only means whereby such values can be supported. Say for instance I 
have to make a decision whether or not to give generously to the poor. If I am coerced 
into making a particular decision then the means whereby I make that decision is 
morally inferior, regardless of whether or not the decision I make is the morally 
correct one.  
Similarly, proponents of MSDP argue that in focussing on the end of reaching 
the correct moral decisions we may neglect the possibility that the means we use to 
achieve that end might itself be immoral, or contravene moral values. As Walzer 
suggests, “it is not at all obvious that a policy’s rightness is the right reason for 
implementing it” [Walzer, 386]. Put another way, if we introduce an inegalitarian 
decision-making procedure that aims solely at reaching the most justified moral 
decisions, this means might undermine the values the procedure is aimed at promoting 
                                                          
18 Although, as was seen in the previous chapter, some do make the claim that democratic procedures 
are likely to arrive at decisions that support citizens’ rights.  
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[Harrison, 153; Wolff (1996), 79]. For example, if the best way of achieving the 
correct decisions about what society ought to do involves undermining autonomy, and 
we value autonomy more than reaching the correct decisions, then the means we 
employ is incompatible with the ends we desire. 
In the context of this paper then, it may be the case that Liberal Aristocracy 
undermines the very rights and values it is supposed to secure. Even if such a 
procedure could arrive at the correct decisions regarding rights it might be an 
unconscionably immoral means to a moral end. It may, for instance be a violation of 
citizens’ autonomy if they are not allowed to vote on all decisions that bind everyone 
equally. 
In this section I argue against this idea. I claim that Liberal Aristocracy, in 
addition to arriving at the most justified decisions about citizens’ moral rights and 
duties, could be as moral a means as an egalitarian democratic procedure. That is, I 
claim that Liberal Aristocratic procedures could make collectively binding decisions 
about citizens’ moral rights without such rights being undermined in the process. 
 
Three central claims are offered in support of the idea that democratic procedures are 
the only, or the most, moral means of arriving at collectively binding decisions19. 
First, democracy is argued to support deliberation, which gives rise to morally 
relevant effects. Second, democratic procedures are required in order to attain the 
autonomous consent of citizens, which is necessary if decisions are to be legitimately 
binding on subjects. Third, democratic procedures are seen to express recognition of 
citizens’ equal status in a way that inegalitarian procedures could not. I examine 
arguments for these three claims and hold that where democratic procedures are 
shown to be moral means of social decision-making, a Liberal Aristocratic means 
could be at least as moral. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Obviously it is impossible to examine all the arguments to the effect that democracy is a moral 
means. I take the following claims and the arguments for them to be a fair representation of existing 
justifications for democracy. 
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3.1. Deliberation 
Fair deliberation is often argued to be the cornerstone of democracy. Citizens must 
have the right to the maximum available information through free and open debate, 
and such debate must recognise each individual’s right to express their opinions in a 
public forum. No opinion should be suppressed or ignored without strong 
justification. 
At least three claims have been offered in support of the idea that deliberation 
must be accommodated in order for any procedure to be a moral means of reaching 
collectively binding decisions. First, participation has educative effects on 
participants, such as moral and intellectual development. Second, fair deliberation can 
contribute to moral progress in society in general. Finally, deliberation leads to a 
spirit of critical opposition and transparency. I will not dispute these claims. Rather, I 
will briefly discuss why these effects are considered valuable and how deliberation 
can produce these effects. Thereafter I claim that fair deliberation and the values it 
supports can be accommodated by Liberal Aristocracy and thus hold that the moral 
importance of deliberation is no reason to prefer democracy when deciding on matters 
concerning rights. 
 
1. Educative Effects 
Deliberation is argued to lead to moral and intellectual development in participants. 
The worth of such development is often argued to reside in its close relation to the 
value of liberty. Liberal theorists emphasise the importance of self-development 
[Pennock, 28; Christiano, 153], which is deeply rooted in an Aristotelian activist 
conception of the good. Aristotle envisaged humans as the ‘political animal’ – a “set 
of distinctive potentialities oriented towards development and actualisation whose 
well-being will consist precisely in that development and realisation” [Hyland, 187]. 
Participation in political deliberation is seen to provide important 
opportunities for self-development of one’s moral and intellectual capacities. These 
capacities are instrumentally valuable for obvious reasons, and, on an Aristotelian 
schema, intrinsically valuable since they contribute to the flourishing of citizens, and 
the development of a virtuous character [Aristotle, 1141b]. 
Citizens’ moral development stems from the necessity of justifying one’s 
views to others. This is seen to contribute to the development of a capacity for 
empathy, and the ability to regard and treat fellow citizens as rational agents who are 
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worthy of moral concern and support. Intellectual abilities are similarly developed by 
the need to be open-minded and to participate in rational discussion. Moral and 
intellectual learning are thus seen as essentially tied to political deliberation 
[Christiano, 156]. 
 
2. Moral Progress 
In addition to leading to moral development in individual participants, many theorists 
have advanced the idea that deliberation could contribute to moral progress in society 
in general. This is due to the fact that fair deliberation allows for the expression of 
alternative moral views and ensures that such views will be given due recognition and 
consideration. Mill, for instance, claims that 
the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing 
the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent 
from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they 
are deprived the opportunity of exchanging the error for truth: if wrong, they 
lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error [Mill, 24]. 
 
Thus, a dominant immoral view can be challenged and shown to be morally 
unacceptable, or a dominant moral view can be challenged and its truth clarified. In 
this way deliberation could give rise to moral progress in society as a whole. 
 
3. Transparent Government 
By allowing the free expression of conflicting ideas, deliberation ensures that all 
opinions are taken into account. Furthermore, the rationale behind collectively 
binding decisions is open to scrutiny by all members of society [Hyland, 186]. Thus 
such decisions are not seen merely as divine dictates, or the whim of incompetent 
rulers. In this way the openness of deliberative structures can contribute to the 
legitimacy of collectively binding decisions [ibid., 187]. 
 
For these reasons (1., 2., & 3.), deliberation should be regarded as valuable. What is 
unclear is that democracy is necessary to support deliberation. Of course most 
theorists regard deliberation as a necessary component of democracy, which is to 
democracy’s credit if the above observations are correct. However, if it can be shown 
that Liberal Aristocracy can also support extensive rights of deliberation, there is no 
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reason to think that democracy should be preferred on this basis. I now argue that 
Liberal Aristocracy is indeed compatible with deliberation. 
 
4. Democracy, Liberal Aristocracy, & Deliberation 
While it can be accepted that deliberative participation does in many cases lead to the 
beneficial effects described, nothing is shown to be contributed by participating in the 
making of the final decision. That is, although the deliberative process may indeed 
produce valuable consequences for individuals and for society in general, it is unclear 
that such consequences are related to democratic procedures themselves 20 . Many 
democratic theorists concede this point. Pennock for instance suggests that regimes 
other than democracy might “protect the freedoms of expression, assembly, and 
association” [Pennock, 150]. Thus there appears to be no reason why educative 
effects, moral progress, and transparency could not be achieved in a deliberative 
system in which the demos did not have direct control over collectively binding 
decisions. 
 
A potential objection to this claim is that one cannot deliberate about the impossible. 
In this case perhaps it is incorrect to suggest that there could be deliberation without 
the possibility of directly influencing the outcome of such deliberation. In discussing 
the conditions for deliberation Aristotle holds that “if people meet with an 
impossibility, they give up… But if it seems possible they will try to do it. What is 
possible is what can be accomplished by our own efforts; what can be brought about 
through our friends is in a sense accomplished by our own efforts” [Aristotle, 1112b]. 
 So, for instance if I believed that a certain law was morally wrong, it would 
have to be at least possible for me to bring about the change of a particular law. 
Otherwise there would be nothing to deliberate about, for people do not deliberate 
about ends themselves, but what is conducive to their ends [ibid.]. If nothing conduces 
to bring about the desired end, then there is nothing about which I can deliberate. 
 In order to show that deliberation is possible in a society with Liberal 
Aristocratic procedures, it must therefore be shown that it is possible to influence 
collectively binding decisions through one’s own effort and without directly 
                                                          
20 Hyland claims otherwise, suggesting that “capacities can only be developed and exercised through 
practice, and democracy is the only system of rule that provides the opportunities for such practice in 
an egalitarian way” [Hyland, 189]. Unfortunately he provides no argument for this claim. 
 38
participating in taking the decision. I will now argue that Liberal Aristocracy does 
indeed provide such opportunities. 
As has been suggested, deliberation brings new information, values, and 
arguments to light, and produces new considerations that decision-makers should take 
into account in their decisions. Consider, for instance, a courtroom scenario. Parties 
deliberate, providing arguments for their case. At the end of proceedings judges will 
consider the arguments and deliver a verdict, usually providing further argument as to 
why that particular decision has been made. In this way judicial deliberation is open 
to scrutiny, and participants have – through their arguments – an opportunity to 
contribute to the final outcome without being directly involved in decision-making.  
Liberal Aristocracy could operate on similar lines. Citizens participate in free 
and open deliberation, and moral experts take into account their opinions and 
arguments in their justifications, which are open to deliberative scrutiny21. In this way 
the beneficial effects of participation could be felt, without resorting to democratic 
procedures that (as I argued in the previous chapter) are likely to lead to morally 
inferior decisions regarding rights. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Deliberation and its beneficial effects can thus be accommodated in a society in which 
collectively binding decisions regarding rights are taken undemocratically22. Since 
this is the case democracy’s claim to support deliberation is not an argument against 
Liberal Aristocracy. The beneficial effects of deliberation described above thus do not 
give reason to think that Liberal Aristocratic procedures are a morally deficient means 
of taking collectively binding decisions.  
Nevertheless these considerations furnish us with an initial requirement that 
must be taken into account if Liberal Aristocracy is to be legitimate. It must support 
rights of participation in fair deliberation, and Judicial decisions must be open to 
deliberative scrutiny, otherwise morally significant factors such as educative effects, 
moral progress, and transparency are likely to be undermined. 
 
                                                          
21 Deliberation would thus also keep Judges’ in touch with public values, contributing to the quality of 
their judgments. 
22 This conclusion should be unsurprising when one considers that most modern democracies have 
inegalitarian structures, such as Constitutional or Supreme Courts. Far from undermining deliberation 
these structures are usually thought to support extensive rights of free expression. 
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3.2. Autonomy & Consent 
One of the most important arguments offered in support of MSDP is that democracy 
is required if collectively binding decisions are to secure the consent of citizens. 
Consent is closely related to the fundamental value of autonomy, or self-rule. For 
Kantians in particular self-rule is the “the fundamental form of moral obligation for 
any moral agent” [Hyland, 142]. Perhaps the most powerful expression of the 
requirements of autonomy is that of Thoreau: “The only obligation which I have a 
right to assume, is to do at any time what I think right” [ibid.].  
So for instance if a law is passed against wearing a crucifix in public, such a 
law ought not to obligate the compliance of those who did not freely consent to be 
bound by the law. Being autonomous requires that I must freely endorse the laws that 
bind me. I ought not to subordinate my own judgement to that of another, and thus I 
should not be subject to laws I reject [ibid.]. If this is so then the only way I can be 
obligated to abide by a collectively binding decision is if I have consented to that 
decision. Only in this way can a law be legitimately binding upon those subject to it. 
Three types of argument are offered in support of the claim that democratic 
procedures are required to secure the autonomous consent of citizens. The first is that 
democratic procedures allow citizens to be self-ruling because every individual 
directly contributes to the creation of collectively binding laws. The second is that 
democratic procedures indirectly secure consent because through their participation 
citizens autonomously accept an obligation to comply. That is, by voting citizens 
incur an obligation to accept the outcome of the democratic process even if it differs 
from the one they would have chosen. Finally, some theorists claim that we should 
sacrifice the idea that autonomy ought to be inviolable, and instead regard self-rule as 
a goal to be maximised. In this case democracy is regarded as the best system, since 
the maximum number of autonomous choices is actualised. 
I will argue that none of these arguments succeeds. Since this is the case no 
reason is provided to prefer democracy on the basis of the value of autonomy.  
 
1. Direct consent 
It might be suggested that democracy supports the value of autonomy because in a 
democracy all citizens participate in the taking of collectively binding decisions. 
Since every citizen has an opportunity to participate in the taking of collectively 
binding decisions by voting for representatives or particular laws, citizens are subject 
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only to laws that they create. They directly consent to the law that is created, and thus 
incur an obligation to comply. 
This argument rapidly unravels upon closer inspection. This can be seen when 
we ask what voting contributes to the realisation of an autonomous choice. The 
answer in the democratic case is that the contribution of voting to self-rule is 
negligible. This is because one’s choices are only actualised as a social product 
insofar as they have the assent of many others [Christiano, 158]. That is, my capacity 
to make my autonomous choice collectively binding is made insignificant by the 
extent to which I rely on others.  
For example, five friends and I have a choice between going to a public 
swimming pool and going to play bowls. We cannot do both because we only have 
one car, and the bowling green is far away from the swimming pool. We decide to 
vote, and the two of us who want to play bowls are outnumbered. My vote has in no 
way contributed to the outcome that I desire, and my autonomous choice is impeded. 
 The point is that if the social decision is not entirely my decision, then the 
collectively binding decision that I must obey is not determined by me. I can be bound 
and influenced by laws and institutions that I did not agree to, and which are more the 
product of others’ participation than of my own. This is, as Christiano notes, a 
“paradigmatic case of unfreedom” [ibid.] because my obligation to do only that which 
I think is right is undermined by the fact that I must obey rules that I did not create. 
Thus I may as well be bossed about by a dictator as by a majority, because in neither 
case can I be said to have autonomously chosen the rule which I obey. 
 This argument thus fails to show that participation in democratic procedures 
contributes anything to individual citizens being self-ruling. Since this is so, the 
argument for democracy on the basis of direct consent fails to show that democratic 
procedures are preferable to Liberal Aristocracy. 
 
2. Indirect Consent 
Some theorists argue that democratic procedures generate an obligation to comply, 
even when the decision that is reached differs from the preferred outcome. That is, I 
endorse the collectively binding decision even when it differs from the outcome I 
would have chosen. 
 I will discuss two arguments to this effect. First I will examine Rousseau’s 
claim that citizens are obligated to accept the results of voting by their commitment to 
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the common good. I claim that this argument relies on the premise that democratic 
procedures will reach the correct decisions, which was argued to be incorrect in §2.4. 
Second, I discuss Singer’s argument that by voting I lead others to reasonably believe 
that I will comply, and thus incur an obligation to do so. I claim that Singer’s 
argument also fails because causing others to reasonably believe that I will comply is 
insufficient to generate an obligation to do so. 
 
Rousseau’s stated aim was to identify a form of political association whereby “each 
one, while uniting with all” for defence and protection, “nevertheless obeys only 
himself and remains as free as before” [Rousseau, Bk IV]. That is, citizens obey the 
same laws but remain autonomous. Rousseau’s argument can be briefly put as 
follows: 
1. In order to be autonomous citizens must promote the common good [ibid.] 
2. Promoting the common good requires not only that citizens act in accordance with 
the rule that is for the common good, but also that they participate in determining 
what that rule is. 
3. Therefore, in order for citizens to be free, they must participate in the creation of 
rules that promote the common good. 
Rousseau’s argument invokes a more substantive notion of autonomy as consisting in 
the promotion of the common good. In this way it is thought that by promoting the 
common good through collective decision-making, citizens will be bound to the 
results of voting. Let us look more closely at this argument. 
 Premise 1 above derives from Rousseau’s contention that in order to regard 
myself as a person I require the esteem and recognition of others who are at least my 
equals in their moral and intellectual capacities [ibid., Bk I]. Because this recognition 
is of such importance to me, I cannot act without reference to the needs of others. My 
personhood requires that I must promote the good of others so that I can be 
recognised. Since the promotion of the good of others is a requirement of my 
personhood, it is also a requirement of my being free. Thus I must promote the 
common good in order to be autonomous. 
 Premise 2 is the most important step for advocates of democracy because it 
attempts to provide a link between participation in democratic procedures and the 
promotion of the common good. Why can I not merely act in accordance with the rule 
that is for the common good? Why must I also participate in the creation of that rule? 
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Rousseau’s argument is that the common good can only be achieved through a 
process of deliberation and voting. Citizens meet together and discuss laws and 
policies that could be adopted. Such deliberation has a transformative effect on 
citizens’ interest in and opinions of the common good. These effects of deliberation 
have already been described (§3.1) so I will not go into further detail here. The point 
is that when citizens finally come to vote on the laws and policies that will be 
adopted, the likelihood that they will come to the correct decisions as to the common 
good is greatly increased. In this way it is thought that a democratic decision will 
realise everyone’s interest in achieving the common good. Even if the decision is not 
the one that I would have taken I will accept it, because accepting the rule that is for 
the common good is necessary for me to be autonomous.  
 
However, a further claim is required in order to show that deliberation and 
participation in collective decision-making are necessary to secure the common good. 
It must be shown that democratic procedures are likely to lead to decisions that 
promote the common good. This, at least, is what seems to be implied by the 
following oft-quoted passage from Rousseau: 
The constant will of all the members of the state is the general will; through it 
they are citizens and free. When a law is proposed in the people’s assembly, 
what is asked of them is not precisely whether they approve or reject, but 
whether it conforms to the general will that is theirs. Each man, in giving his 
vote, states his opinion on this matter, and the declaration of the general will is 
drawn from the counting of votes. When, therefore, the opinion contrary to 
mine prevails, this proves merely that I was in error, and that what I took to be 
the general will was not so. If my private opinion has prevailed, I would have 
done something other than what I had wanted [Rousseau, Bk 4, Ch. 2]. 
 
I consent to the decision that is taken because it is the decision that I really wanted. 
That is, it is the decision that promotes the common good. Therefore my consent to 
the decision that is ultimately taken relies on the confidence I have that democratic 
procedures will arrive at decisions that are for the common good. Without this 
confidence I need not accept that my private opinion is mistaken. 
 Thus in order to show that democratic decisions do legitimately bind citizens, 
it must be argued that democratic procedures are likely to arrive at decisions that are 
for the common good. In this case the consent of citizens should be assured because 
the general will achieved through democratic voting promotes common good. 
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If, however, an alternative procedure is likely to make better decisions, then 
according Rousseau’s model that procedure should secure the consent of citizens. In 
this case the alternative procedure is more likely to satisfy each citizen’s interest in 
achieving the common good.  
In §2.4 I argued that democratic voting was likely to lead to worse decisions 
regarding the common good than Liberal Aristocracy. Thus it follows that the 
decisions of Judges should secure the consent of citizens to a greater extent than 
democratic procedures. Because we are bound to follow rules that are for the common 
good in order to be autonomous, self-rule requires that we obey the justified decisions 
of Constitutional Court Judges who are moral experts. Thus, if we accept Rousseau’s 
requirements for autonomy this appears to provide further reason to prefer Liberal 
Aristocratic procedures. 
  
The second type of indirect consent argument relies on a purported similarity between 
voting and promising. By voting I make a promise to others and they make similar 
promises to me, thus generating obligations. Without such obligations I could be 
substantially less free. Say for instance a friend promises to play backgammon with 
me. If they break their obligation then my autonomous choice to play backgammon is 
thwarted. Thus the practice of promise-keeping actually contributes to my autonomy, 
rather than undermining it. Similarly some theorists claim that a vote is similar to a 
promise and entails an obligation to comply. Clearly though for this argument to go 
through it has to be shown that voting is relevantly similar to promising. 
 
One argument that attempts to do so is that of Singer. In Democracy and 
Disobedience, Singer claims that when I vote (as when I promise) I lead others to 
have a reasonable belief that I will comply, and that this generates an obligation to 
comply. His argument can be summarised thus: 
1. By voting I lead others to reasonably believe that I will comply with the 
results of voting. 
2. If my behaviour leads others to reasonably believe that I will do X, then I 
am obligated to do X 
3. Therefore, if I vote then I am obligated to comply with the results of 
voting [Singer, 50]. 
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If this is correct then the fact that I vote generates an obligation. I indirectly consent to 
the outcome, even when the decision differs from my private opinion. I discuss this 
argument and claim that it fails because premise 2 is incorrect. That is, I claim that 
another’s reasonable belief that I will do X is insufficient to generate an obligation to 
do X. 
 Singer claims that the fact that I vote makes it reasonable for others to believe 
that I will comply (premise 1). This is because if no one obeyed the vote, then there 
would be no point in voting at all [ibid.]. Everyone who agreed with the vote would 
do as they please, and those who did not would do what they pleased. Voting when I 
will not comply with the results is as pointless as the practise of promising would be if 
no one did as they promised. Thus if I vote it is reasonable for others to expect me to 
comply, simply because of what voting is [ibid., 51], just as it is reasonable for others 
to believe that I will do as I promised because of what promising is.  
 Premise two is seen to be justified because “[t]here are circumstances in which 
behaviour may give rise to an obligation to act as if there is consent, even when there 
is no actual consent”  [ibid., 49]. For instance, if I buy a round of drinks for James and 
Gareth, and James buys a round of drinks for Gareth and I, Gareth has incurred an 
obligation by accepting the drinks that we bought for him. If he refused we would 
rightly say that he has done wrong. The obligation is not generated by any actual 
consent, because Gareth may never have intended to buy a round. If Gareth does not 
give some positive expression of non-consent, then he leads James and I to reasonably 
believe that he will buy us a round [ibid.]. Singer suggests that the fact that Gareth 
leads us to have this reasonable belief is what creates the obligation to buy a round.  
The same is true of voting because when I vote others are reasonably led to 
believe that I will comply – because of what voting is. Since this is the case voting 
obligates my consent, just as Gareth’s acceptance of the drinks obligates him to buy a 
round. 
 However, I argue that others’ reasonable beliefs do not generate obligations. 
This can be seen in the following examples. Michel Schumacher has won the last 
fifteen Grand Prix. My neighbour waters her garden every day. Michael 
Schumacher’s behaviour – consistently winning – leads me quite reasonably to 
believe that he will win the next Grand Prix. My neighbour’s behaviour – regularly 
watering her garden – leads me to reasonably believe that she will water her garden 
tomorrow. In both cases some behaviour leads me to form a reasonable belief, but in 
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neither case would it be correct to say that an obligation is generated. Michael 
Schumacher is certainly not obligated to win the next Grand Prix, and neither is my 
neighbour obligated to water her garden. It is clear therefore that my leading others to 
have a reasonable belief that I will do X is insufficient to impose an obligation to do 
X23. 
 Thus although promising and voting may both lead to a reasonable belief, 
Singer’s argument fails to show that this is a relevant similarity. That is, the fact that 
both lead to a reasonable belief does not generate an obligation. Premise 2 is false. 
Since this is so Singer’s argument fails to show that by voting I consent to the 
outcome of voting. Democratic procedures do not legitimately bind participants in the 
way that a promise would. 
 Arguments for MSDP on the basis of indirect consent are as unsuccessful as 
the argument on the basis of direct consent. Perhaps, however, there is more hope for 
the claim that democratic procedures maximise autonomy. 
 
3. Maximum Autonomy 
Graham argues that people’s autonomous choices will often conflict. So for instance 
my desire to play garden bowls might conflict with my brother’s desire to play garden 
cricket with his friends. We cannot do both, and thus one of our autonomous choices 
will necessarily be disappointed. The situation in any system of social co-operation is 
necessarily analogous: sometimes some citizens’ autonomous choices will have to be 
disappointed so that the autonomous choices of others can be realised. That is, the 
Kantian obligation to do that which one thinks is right is not universalisable because 
my opinion of what is right is likely to conflict with the opinions of others [Graham, 
131]. 
Thus, rather than treating autonomy as an inviolable right, we should think of 
it as a goal to be maximised. For Graham, democratic majority rule is the best way to 
achieve this maximisation. Each citizen votes and the position that has the greatest 
number of votes becomes collectively binding law. Thus the autonomous choice of 
the maximum number is realised. 
                                                          
23 There is something troubling about this quick move. Although I think this argument does target an 
important premise for the claim that voting secures consent, I must admit that I do not feel I have fully 
come to grips with Singer’s argument. 
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The first problem that this argument raises is that it is not clear that democratic 
participation contributes anything to the supposed maximisation of autonomy. If the 
outcome that is chosen coincides with that which the majority would have chosen, 
what difference does it make that citizens actually participated in democratic 
procedures? The emphasis moves from having a moral procedural means that secures 
the autonomy of citizens to arriving at moral outcomes that maximise autonomy. Thus 
even if it is accepted that maximising autonomy requires making decisions that 
coincide with what the majority thinks is right, this does not provide a reason to prefer 
democratic procedures. 
Furthermore it is far from clear that Graham is correct in claiming that 
maximising autonomy entails making collectively binding decisions that coincide 
with the choices of the majority. That is, Graham’s argument conflates maximum 
autonomy with autonomy for the maximum number, and these may well be different 
[Christiano, 160]. Say for instance a minority wishes that the right of freedom of 
religion should be extended to all, while the majority wants to enforce Catholicism 
and ban all other religions. In this case the minority wants a decision that will increase 
a particular type of autonomy, whereas the majority wants a decision that will 
decrease citizens’ ability to do what they think is right. The claim that the outcome 
desired by the majority would maximise autonomy is exceptionally dubious. Indeed, 
considerations of this kind could provide support for the claim that Liberal 
Aristocracy should be used to decide matters concerning rights. Since the 
maximisation of autonomy is now a matter of outcomes and because a minority of 
Constitutional Court Judges will make better decisions concerning how to protect and 
maximise citizens’ scope for autonomous choice, then the moral end of maximising 
autonomy will be furthered if that minority’s decisions are made collectively binding. 
Thus Graham’s argument fails to provide support for MSDP for at least two 
reasons. First, it does not show that participation in democratic procedures is 
necessary for the realisation of the maximum number of autonomous choices. Second, 
it unjustifiably assumes that autonomy is maximised by a collective decision that 
satisfies the maximum number of autonomous choices. The idea that autonomy is a 
goal to be maximised thus provides no support for MSDP as democratic procedures 
are not shown to maximise autonomy.  
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4. Conclusion 
In this section I have argued that three types of argument for MSDP are unsuccessful 
in showing that democracy is a preferable moral means on the basis of its capacity to 
secure consent. The first type of argument claimed that democracy secures consent 
directly because citizens create the rules by which they are bound. I argued that voting 
does not contribute to citizens being self-ruling because the rules that are chosen, and 
by which one must abide, are more the product of others’ choices than of one’s own 
autonomous choice. The contribution made by my vote to the realisation of my 
autonomous choice is negligible, and thus cannot be seen as contributing to my 
consent to the outcome. 
The second type of argument claimed that citizens indirectly consent to the 
outcome of democratic procedures, even when that outcome is other than that which 
they would have chosen. I looked at two arguments to this effect – that of Rousseau 
and that of Singer. I argued that Rousseau’s claim depended on the assumption that 
democratic procedures are likely to arrive at decisions that promote the common 
good. Thus I claimed that because Liberal Aristocracy will promote the common good 
to a greater extent than democratic procedures it should be preferable on Rousseau’s 
model. 
Singer’s argument attempted to show that voting is relevantly similar to 
making a promise because both lead to reasonable beliefs. In this way voting was seen 
to generate an obligation to comply. Voters indirectly consent to accept the outcome 
of voting even when it is not the outcome they desired. I claimed that the fact that 
both promising and voting lead to reasonable beliefs was not a relevant similarity, 
since the fact that I lead someone to have a reasonable belief is insufficient to 
generate an obligation. Singer’s argument thus fails to show that participants in 
democratic procedures indirectly consent to the outcome. 
Finally I discussed Graham’s argument to the effect that maximisation of 
autonomy requires democratic procedures. I argued that it failed: firstly because an 
inegalitarian procedure could make decisions that coincide with the decisions that 
would be taken by the maximum number, and second because the decision taken by 
the maximum number does not necessarily maximise autonomy. 
 Since all these types of argument fail, it remains possible that an inegalitarian 
means could support the value of autonomy to the same extent as, or to a greater 
extent than, a democratic means. 
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3.3. Public Recognition & Respect 
Pennock and Hyland suggest that the strongest argument for democracy is that it 
expresses public recognition of citizens’ status as equals [Pennock, 153; Hyland, 189]. 
Such recognition is argued to be valuable on the basis of Hegel’s well-known Master-
Slave dialectic. Without the recognition of others, humans cannot recognise their 
worth, and thus are deprived of the dignity that should be accorded to conscious 
persons. However, as Hyland notes, we 
do not need Hegelian dialectic to convince ourselves of the importance of such 
recognition of worth to us; all we need is to imagine the contrary situation, 
imagine ourselves, that is, as publicly proclaimed inferiors [ibid., 189]. 
 
Similarly, Pennock writes 
[t]o legally brand some individuals as unequal, to deprive them of that badge 
of democratic citizenship, the franchise, an equal franchise, would not only be 
a denial of a core principle of democracy, it would at the same time be an 
affront to the human dignity, the self-respect of those who were thus 
discriminated against [Pennock, 154]. 
 
It is clear, then, that recognition of equal status is of profound moral importance. 
What is less clear is what is actually meant by “recognition of equal status”, and why 
such recognition is seen to require democracy. Neither Hyland nor Pennock elaborate 
on this point. 
I think this vagueness derives from a conflation of two similar but distinct 
claims. The first claim is that democratic procedures recognise citizens as having 
equal status, and the second is that inegalitarian procedures necessarily fail to 
recognise the equal status of citizens. Clearly both claims are required if democratic 
procedures are to be preferred to inegalitarian procedures on the basis of recognition. 
If democratic procedures do not recognise the equal status of citizens then the 
argument fails and cannot be used as a defence of MSDP, even if inegalitarian 
procedures also fail to recognise equal status. If inegalitarian procedures do not of 
necessity fail to recognise citizens’ status then even if democracy does recognise 
citizens’ equal status, an alternative procedure might still be preferable if further 
reasons can be provided in its favour. In this section I attempt to clarify what is meant 
by “recognition of equal status”. I argue that democracy does support recognition 
because it accommodates deliberation. However, I argue that since Liberal 
Aristocracy can promote extensive fair deliberation, this does not give us reason to 
prefer democratic procedures. 
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1. The Meaning of “Recognition” 
The first question is how to understand the phrase “recognition of equal status”. 
Hyland uses it interchangeably with the phrase “recognition of worth” [Hyland, 189], 
but this is equally as equivocal. Beitz gives a clearer interpretation: perhaps the idea is 
that 
fair institutions should express public recognition of the equal worth of 
persons conceived as autonomous centers of deliberation and action: such 
institutions should avoid interfering with, and when possible should contribute 
to, their members’ respect for  themselves and one another as equally capable 
of making deliberate choices about their own situations and of carrying out 
those choices in action [Beitz, 93]. 
 
This seems like a sensible interpretation, and, in the absence of any clearer statement 
of the requirements of recognition, I will make use of this one. The question now is 
how this conception of recognition is seen to provide an argument for democracy. 
North suggests that democracy could be justified because “an individual’s 
autonomy and moral personality are given public expression and acknowledgement” 
[North, 174-5]. I think this idea can be readily accepted, and thus the first claim above 
– that democratic procedures support recognition of equal status – is vindicated. 
However, while this provides an argument for democracy, I now claim that 
democracy recognises citizens’ equal status because it supports deliberation, which, as 
I have suggested, can be supported by Liberal Aristocracy. 
 
2. Democracy, Deliberation, & Recognition 
Democracy is argued to be a procedure that expresses recognition of people’s status 
as autonomous persons with moral personality. How does it do this? Since I have 
already argued that egalitarian voting does not uphold autonomy to any greater extent 
than inegalitarian procedures could, it is clear that participation in democratic voting 
is not what contributes to the public recognition of autonomy. Voting does not 
contribute to the realisation of people’s autonomous wishes, and the final outcome 
may totally ignore or even undermine citizens’ autonomy because democracy may 
reach decisions that undermine citizens’ rights. 
 Rather, public recognition is supported by the fact that fair deliberation 
provides an outlet for the expression of citizens’ moral opinions. That is, deliberation 
supports and recognises citizens’ capacity to form and express opinions, and in 
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addition can contribute to people’s recognition of one another as rational beings 
whose opinions deserve respect [Beitz, 93].  
As Beitz correctly notes, and as I argued previously (§3.1.4), these 
considerations can be accommodated in a variety of ways. “In particular, they do not 
establish that we should have egalitarian procedures” [ibid.]. Indeed, a Liberal 
Aristocratic procedure could arrive at decisions that improve the quality of 
deliberation by protecting citizens’ rights of freedom of expression. Thus Liberal 
Aristocracy could be preferable on the basis of equal respect. 
 
3. Respect, Fairness & Degrading Reasons 
I think the force of arguments for democracy of the basis of respect and recognition 
derives from the empirical fact that many undemocratic regimes have affronted 
human dignity by regarding certain individuals and groups as morally and 
intellectually inferior. The exclusion of women and blacks from the franchise is one 
example of this tendency. However, it seems that in these cases insult is felt at least 
partly because the deprivation of the franchise is unfair. That is, citizens are deprived 
of the franchise on the basis of considerations – such as race or sex – that are not 
relevant to the ability to make collectively binding decisions. Thus there is one 
obvious consideration that must be taken into account. Any deprivation of the 
franchise must be justified by reasons that are relevant. 
 I said that matters of fairness are part of what leads to feelings of insult. Could 
it be the case that an institution is fair, and yet that institution still justifiably causes 
insult? I think that that it could. Say, for instance some person has consistently made 
bad decisions in the past. In this case it might be fair to deprive her of the franchise. 
There is a relevant reason for excluding her from the franchise – she consistently 
makes bad decisions. Yet such a deprivation could be degrading. That person could 
feel excluded and worthless, especially if she believes the reasons for her exclusion 
are correct. 
 In this case the deprivation of the franchise might be reasonable, but it is still 
degrading because it is based on reasons that are hurtful, and which undermine an 
individual’s self-respect. If we value recognition and self-respect perhaps it is better 
to ignore reasons that are insulting, even if they are true. I do not wish to defend this 
claim, although it seems plausible enough given the moral importance of self-respect. 
Rather, I suggest that it furnishes a further consideration that must be taken into 
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account when justifying Liberal Aristocracy. If it is justified on the basis of premises 
that are degrading, a procedure that is not so justified, such as democracy, might be 
preferable.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this section I claimed that there is no essential incompatibility between having 
inegalitarian decision procedures and institutionalising respect and recognition of 
citizens. This claim alone is relatively uninformative, so I discussed other 
considerations that procedures must take into account. What would an inegalitarian 
procedure have to be like in order to support the values of recognition and respect? 
First, it would have to support fair deliberation. Second, it should not discriminate 
against citizens on the basis of irrelevant reasons, such as race or sex. Further, the 
justification for such a procedure should not itself be insulting. It should not, for 
instance, be based on the supposition that individuals are too stupid to take care of 
themselves, or that God has blessed some people with a greater moral worth than 
others. If an inegalitarian procedure can support these criteria, then there is no reason 
why it should not be preferred to democracy on the basis of the value of equal 
recognition and respect. 
 Liberal Aristocracy does fulfil these criteria. It is based on the premises that 
democracy will sometimes undermine citizens’ rights, and that Constitutional Court 
Judges with moral expertise will protect such rights. Clearly these are relevant reasons 
to place limits on the extent of democratic decision-making.  
 Further the argument for Liberal Aristocracy did not claim that people who 
aren’t moral experts are stupid or worthless. Rather, it holds that people will 
sometimes be wrong about what rights citizens should have, or that when they cast 
their vote they will not consider what it is reasonable for others to endorse (§2.4.4). 
Most people would, I believe, accept these claims without any feelings of insult. 
 In conclusion, then, Liberal Aristocracy is based on relevant reasons that 
should not be degrading to citizens. Furthermore, since Liberal Aristocracy is more 
likely to secure rights of deliberation than democracy unaided is, the value of 
recognition is likely to be supported to a greater extent than it would be if 
Constitutional limits were not placed on democracy and protected by a qualified 
external authority. 
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3.4. Moral Means: Conclusion 
I argued that three central claims offered in support of democratic procedures are 
unsuccessful. First, I argued that democracy is a moral means because it supports 
deliberation (§3.1). Thus, because an inegalitarian procedure is compatible with 
extensive rights of participation in fair deliberation, I argued that democracy should 
not be preferred to Liberal Aristocracy on this basis. Thereafter, I examined three 
types of argument to the effect that democracy is a moral means because it secures the 
autonomous consent of citizens (§3.2). I claimed that none of these arguments showed 
that democratic means are morally superior to inegalitarian means. Indeed, the last 
argument based on maximisation of autonomy was seen to provide support for the 
claim that an inegalitarian procedure might be preferable if it arrived at decisions that 
increased the scope of citizens’ autonomous activities. Finally I discussed arguments 
to the effect that democracy was required if citizens were not to feel degraded by a 
lack of public recognition and respect (§3.3). I argued that although democracy does 
support the value of recognition, democratic procedures are not necessary do so. This 
is because recognition of equal rights in deliberation is the central contributor to 
public recognition and respect. Since deliberation can be accommodated in a society 
that uses a Liberal Aristocratic procedures, there is no incompatibility between this 
inegalitarian procedure and public recognition of citizens’ equal status. Thus none of 
these arguments provide reason to believe that Liberal Aristocracy could not be a 
moral means of arriving at collectively binding decisions. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
 
I began this dissertation by discussing a purported inconsistency in the liberal 
democratic synthesis. On the one hand democracy is justified on the basis of liberal 
values. On the other hand democracy can conflict with the liberal basis from which it 
is derived. Where it does, the liberal democratic synthesis is undermined because the 
democratic element is inconsistent with its liberal counterpart. 
 This inconsistency is highlighted by posing the question of how rights-based 
limits on democracy should be implemented. How, for instance, should a citizen who 
discovers that a certain democratically created law violates her or others’ rights go 
about changing that law? One method would be to form or join a political party, and 
attempt to gain sufficient support so that the law could be changed democratically. 
This would be most consistent with the democratic aspect of the liberal democratic 
synthesis. 
 However, I argued in §2.4 that this method, though possibly successful, may 
well fail. The moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights will not always be supported by 
the demos, and thus democratic procedures will sometimes undermine citizens’ rights. 
In such cases the democratic part of the liberal democratic synthesis is privileged at 
the expense of liberal rights. 
 A further way of challenging a law that violates citizens’ rights is to appeal to 
an extra-democratic authority with the power to constrain democratic decision-
making. This solution was shown to raise further problems: Would the postulated 
authority be sufficiently qualified as to warrant the power to place limitations on the 
express will of the demos? Can a non-democratic means of taking collectively binding 
decisions be morally legitimate? If these questions are answered in the negative, then 
the extra-democratic authority is neither justified nor legitimate. The purpose of this 
dissertation has been to describe a procedure in which the above questions can be 
answered in the affirmative. That is, I have described a non-democratic procedure – 
Liberal Aristocracy – and claimed that i) it was better qualified than democracy to 
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support the moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights and that ii) it would be a morally 
legitimate means of doing so. 
 In Liberal Aristocracy extra-democratic authority rests in the judgments of 
Constitutional Court Judges with moral expertise. Such judgments must be based on 
Judges’ understanding of public values, rather than on their own particular religious 
or philosophical views. Moral expertise was argued to be especially conducive to the 
end of arriving at decisions that accord with public values because it postulates a skill 
for providing arguments that are couched in terms that all reasonable and rational 
agents in a particular society would endorse, should they give the arguments sufficient 
consideration. For this reason Constitutional Court Judges’ with moral expertise were 
argued to be ideally situated to adjudge when decisions taken democratically by 
citizens or their representatives undermined the reasonable provisions of the 
Constitution. Liberal Aristocracy thus provides an ideal buttress against democratic 
encroachments on citizens’ rights. 
 However, I suggested that designating a qualified authority is insufficient for 
the authority of Constitutional Court Judges to be legitimate. It was also necessary to 
claim that the very idea of a minority deciding against the majority is not a violation 
of citizens’ rights. That is, it was necessary to show that the liberal basis for 
attributing rights is compatible with an undemocratic authority. I claimed that 
arguments to the effect that collectively binding decisions ought only to be taken 
through democratic procedures were unsuccessful. To the extent that democratic 
means are morally legitimate, so are Liberal Aristocratic means. 
 This provides an answer to the question raised at the beginning of this 
dissertation. If a citizen discovers that a democratically created law is in violation of 
her rights then she can attain legal representation and appeal to the Constitutional 
Court. Provided her case is sufficiently motivated by public values, and assuming that 
Constitutional Court Judges are moral experts, Judges will use their extra-democratic 
authority to revoke the unjust democratically created law24. The decision to do so will 
be justified because it will be dictated by reasons that no citizen could reasonably 
reject. It will thus further the moral end of protecting citizens’ rights. Furthermore, the 
Liberal Aristocratic procedure used will also be a morally legitimate means, since it 
will not undermine the moral basis of justifications for democracy. In the remainder 
                                                          
24 This is obviously a somewhat simplistic interpretation of legal proceedings, but it encapsulates the 
elements that are relevant to my argument 
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of this dissertation I will attempt to draw out some of the implications of this 
conclusion. 
 
4.1. Liberal Democracy & Liberal Aristocracy 
Although my aim in this dissertation has been to justify an authority with the power to 
constrain democracy, it is worth saying a few words about the fate of the liberal 
democratic synthesis. Is it necessarily undermined by the existence of a justified non-
democratic authority?  
 In the first place it should be noted that I have not argued against the liberal 
democratic synthesis. I have not, for instance claimed that democratic means are 
necessarily incompatible with sustaining citizens’ rights. Instead I argued that 
democratic means are not compatible with liberal values to a greater extent than 
Liberal Aristocracy, and that where democracy infringes upon rights, Liberal 
Aristocracy is more suited to sustaining liberal values. Democracy should thus be 
seen as prima facie compatible with those rights. That is, democracy is compatible 
with liberalism on the condition that rights are not infringed upon [Hyland, 160]. 
Where democracy does undermine rights the inconsistency in the liberal democratic 
synthesis recurs, because although the means may be as legitimate as Liberal 
Aristocratic means, democratically reached ends may be morally unjustifiable. 
 Thus I see no a priori reason why the arguments of this dissertation necessarily 
weaken the liberal democratic synthesis. Rather, Liberal Aristocracy should be seen 
as complementing the liberal democratic synthesis by designating a qualified 
authority that intervenes when democracy fails to sustain citizens’ rights. Without 
such intervention the liberal democratic synthesis will sometimes be undermined 
because citizens’ rights will neglected. 
 
4.2. The Scope of Liberal Aristocracy 
It might be claimed that a consequence of the argument for Liberal Aristocratic 
procedures is that democratic procedures are redundant and serve no moral purpose. 
In this case perhaps we should scrap the liberal democratic synthesis and opt for a 
pure Liberal Aristocracy. The fear of this type of society underlies the following 
passage from Walzer’s “Philosophy and Democracy”. 
 Imagine a… judicially recognised right to welfare… A defensible right 
 surely… yet… the judicial enforcement of welfare rights would radically 
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 reduce the reach of democratic decisions. Henceforth the judges would 
 decide, and as cases accumulated they would decide in increasing detail, 
 what the scope and character  of the welfare system should be and what sorts 
 of distribution it required [Walzer, 391]. 
 
The possibility of an extended scope of Liberal Aristocratic decision-making must be 
acknowledged. However, Walzer’s fear that Judges’ extra-democratic authority will 
result in a slippery slope towards drastic limitation of the scope of democratic 
decision-making does not follow from the arguments I have offered in favour of 
Liberal Aristocracy. Again I stress that I have not argued that democracy serves no 
moral purpose. All I have claimed is that in one particular area – the protection of 
existing Constitutional rights – the authority of Constitutional Court Judges is 
justified, provided they have moral expertise. Democracy may, for instance be far 
more likely than Liberal Aristocracy to reach the correct decisions with respect to 
other moral ends, such as maximising preference satisfaction. Indeed, it seems highly 
unlikely that Judges with moral expertise would be likely to know citizens preferences 
to a greater extent than citizens themselves. 
 The point is that further arguments must be provided if the scope of Liberal 
Aristocracy is to be justifiably extended. Such extensions do not obviously follow 
from my arguments for Liberal Aristocracy.  
 On the other hand, although the arguments offered in this dissertation do not 
entail that decisions other than those regarding rights should be beyond the scope of 
democracy, they may facilitate other arguments that seek to justify such limitations on 
democratic procedures.  
 In this case it is the task of democratic theorists to show why an increased 
scope of Liberal Aristocratic decision-making should be seen as undesirable, given 
that Liberal Aristocracy is a morally legitimate means that, in at least some matters, is 
more likely than democracy to arrive at moral decisions that all reasonable citizens 
should endorse. 
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